Natural disasters and political engagement : evidence from the 2010–11 Pakistani floods. by Fair,  C. Christine et al.
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
17 May 2017
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Fair, C. Christine and Kuhn, Patrick M. and Malhotra, Neil and Shapiro, Jacob N. (2017) 'Natural disasters
and political engagement : evidence from the 201011 Pakistani ﬂoods.', Quarterly journal of political science.,
12 (1). pp. 99-141.
Further information on publisher's website:
https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00015075
Publisher's copyright statement:
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
Natural Disasters and Political Engagement: Evidence from the
2010-11 Pakistani Floods⇤
C. Christine Fair† Patrick M. Kuhn‡ Neil Malhotra§ Jacob N. Shapiro¶
Abstract
How natural disasters a↵ect politics in developing countries is an important question given
the fragility of fledgling democratic institutions in some of these countries as well as likely
increased exposure to natural disasters over time due to climate change. Research in sociology
and psychology suggests traumatic events can inspire pro-social behavior and therefore might
increase political engagement. Research in political science argues that economic resources are
critical for political engagement and thus the economic dislocation from disasters may dampen
participation. We argue that when the government and civil society response e↵ectively blunts
a disaster’s economic impacts, then political engagement may increase as citizens learn about
government capacity. Using diverse data from the massive 2010-11 Pakistan floods, we find that
Pakistanis in highly flood-a↵ected areas turned out to vote at substantially higher rates three
years later than those less exposed. We also provide speculative evidence on the mechanism.
The increase in turnout was higher in areas with lower ex ante flood risk, which is consistent with
a learning process. These results suggest that natural disasters may not necessarily undermine
civil society in emerging developing democracies. (JEL: A12, D72, D74, I28, O17)
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How do natural disasters a↵ect politics in developing countries? Addressing this question is
important given the fragility of fledgling democratic institutions in some of these countries as well
as likely increased exposure to natural disasters over time due to climate change (Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change 2013). The existing social science literature makes contradictory predic-
tions. On the one hand, research from sociology and psychology suggests that traumatic events such
as natural disasters can inspire pro-social behavior and therefore might increase political engage-
ment (e.g., Bardo, 1978; Bolin and Stanford, 1998; Rodriguez, Trainor and Quarantelli, 2006; Toya
and Skidmore, 2014). If this is the case, then disasters might enhance the quality of government by
increasing accountability pressures and selecting for a higher-quality political class (e.g., Putnam,
Leonardi and Nanetti, 1994; Besley, 2007). On the other hand, political scientists have argued that
economic resources are critical ingredients for civic engagement (e.g., Verba, Schlozman and Brady,
1995). Kosec and Mo (2015) find that economic shocks resulting from natural disasters can reduce
citizen aspiration levels, which are positively correlated with various forms of civic engagement.
Disasters may therefore dampen participation. Moreover, scholars from a range of disciplines have
suggested that economic shocks create opportunities for violent non-state actors to appeal to citi-
zens (e.g., Collier and Hoe✏er, 2004; Dal Bo and Dal Bo, 2011; Dube and Vargas, 2013), which may
also discourage citizens from working within democratic political channels (United States Agency
for International Development, 2011; Hendirx and Salehyan, 2012).
We argue that when the government and civil society response e↵ectively blunts a disaster’s
economic impacts, mass political engagement should increase.1 Conditional on economic harms
being mitigated, at least three theoretical pathways suggest that natural disasters should increase
political participation.
First, natural disasters lead to the grassroots creation of self-help organizations in many soci-
eties (e.g., Hawkins and Maurer, 2010; Yamamura, 2010). In many places such civic associations
help train citizens in basic functions of self-governance as well as reveal the positive outputs from
collective action, both features that should be positively correlated with political engagement (e.g.,
1Our argument is similar to that of Kosec and Mo (2015), who find that flood relief from the government can
mitigate the negative e↵ects of economic shocks on aspiration levels. They also study the political e↵ects of the 2010
Pakistani floods. This study is distinct in that our dependent variable is turnout whereas the dependent variable
in Kosec and Mo (2015) is aspiration level. Kosec and Mo (2015) show that aspirations are politically meaningful
because they are positively correlated with reports of past turnout before the floods. They do not examine how
disasters a↵ect future turnout (i.e., after the floods).
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Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1994; Banks, 1997). In addition, an extensive psychological litera-
ture has argued that natural disasters encourage altruistic and pro-social behavior such as search
and rescue or providing food and shelter for victims (e.g., Bardo, 1978; Bolin and Stanford, 1998;
Levine and Thompson, 2004; Rodriguez, Trainor and Quarantelli, 2006; Vollhardt, 2009; Toya and
Skidmore, 2014).2 In models of voting, where turnout is driven in part by concerns with the welfare
of other citizens, such changes would be expected to increase participation (e.g., Myatt, 2015).
Second, natural disasters appear to be positively correlated with some indicators of social capital
(e.g., Yamamura, 2016). Critically, the relationship appears to depend on the e cacy of govern-
ment response. The correlation between self-reported damage from earthquakes and self-expressed
interpersonal trust in Latin America, for example, is strongly negative in places where governments
respond poorly to natural disasters (as judged by researchers), but the correlation reverses sign
among those who feel the government response was e↵ective (Carlin, Love and Zechmeister, 2014).
And even though the impact of social capital broadly defined on political participation is contested
(Atkinson and Fowler, 2012, e.g.,), the majority of the literature expects it to be positive.
Third, personal exposure to natural disasters may make salient the importance of government
action and policies that ameliorate economic harm. This, in turn, might make citizens more engaged
with the voting process given a better understanding of the stakes of democratic politics (e.g.,
Jackman, 1987; Hajnal and Lewis, 2003; Pacek, Pop-Eleches and Tucker, 2009). Recent models of
voting suggest that turnout should be increasing in the extent to which citizens think the choice of
government matters for future welfare (Myatt, 2015).
Taken as a whole these three mechanisms suggest that if the government and civil society
response to a disaster is su ciently e↵ective to blunt its economic impacts, and therefore counteract
the potential negative e↵ects described above, then natural disasters should (a) increase political
participation, and (b) increase engagement by stimulating citizen learning.
We explore these hypotheses in the context of Pakistan, an extremely important country of
study for practical and epistemological reasons. On the practical side, Pakistan is of immense
geopolitical relevance. Understanding the drivers of its politics is thus important in its own right.
On the epistemic side, previous research in this area has focused on advanced economies such as the
2Rodriguez, Trainor and Quarantelli (2006), for example, conducted extensive field research in the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans in 2005 and found that instances of pro-social behavior greatly outnumbered
instances of behavior.
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United States (e.g., Achen and Bartels, 2004; Healy and Malhotra, 2010; Gasper and Reeves, 2011;
Sinclair, Hall and Alvarez, 2011) and Germany (Bechtel and Hainmueller, 2011). In the closest U.S.-
based study to ours Sinclair, Hall and Alvarez (2011) show that registered voters in New Orleans
who experienced large-scale flooding were more likely to participate in the following year’s mayoral
election due to receiving more political information from politicians and interest groups than less-
a↵ected citizens. Few studies have departed from the Organization of Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) context. They examined relatively well-established democracies (e.g., Cole,
Healy and Werker, 2011 on India and Gallego, 2012 on Columbia) and explore vote choice—not
participation—as the focal dependent variable.
Specifically, we examine the 2010-11 floods in Pakistan. The 2010 flood a↵ected more than 20
million people, caused between 1,800 and 2,000 deaths, and damaged or destroyed approximately 1.7
million houses, making it the worst flood in Pakistan’s modern history.3 The 2010 floods were driven
by an unusual monsoon storm that dropped historically unprecedented levels of moisture on the
mountainous northwest regions of the country. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province, for example,
received 12 feet of rain from July 28 to August 3, four times its average annual total (Gronewold,
2010). Those exceptionally high rainfall rates triggered flash floods that vastly exceeded anything
in historical memory. As the water drained from KPK during the first week of August, a more
typical monsoon storm inundated the Indus flood plain, rendering it incapable of absorbing the
dramatic inflows from the mountainous regions and overwhelming water management structures.
The following year Pakistan was again hit by an unusually strong monsoon, causing another round
of devastating floods in the southern plains. In both cases the surging waters hit some places
more than others due to the unpredictable combination of human action, prior di↵erences in soil
moisture, micro-topographic di↵erences, and complex fluid dynamics.
Leveraging that plausibly exogenous variation along with diverse data sources—multiple mea-
sures of ex ante flood risk, geospatial flood measures, an original survey of 13,282 households
conducted in January-March 2012, and constituency-level voting results from the last three na-
tional elections (2002, 2008, and 2013)—we show that Pakistanis living in flood-a↵ected places
had substantially higher levels of political participation than their una↵ected peers. They turned
3The EM-DAT International Disaster Database records approximately 20.4 million people a↵ected and 1,985 killed
from the 2010 floods.
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out to vote at higher rates in the 2013 general elections and exhibited a greater increase in elec-
toral participation relative to the last election (2008). These e↵ects are substantively large. Our
estimates suggest that moving from no flooding to the median level of flooding among a↵ected
constituencies (7.9% of the population a↵ected) would lead to a 0.5 percentage point increase in
turnout. Moving from the median to the 90th percentile in flooding (42% of the population a↵ected)
would lead to a 2.2 percentage point increase in turnout. These e↵ects are in line with those ob-
served in door-to-door get-out-the-vote campaigns in the United States and therefore substantively
meaningful.
Because of the limited area a↵ected by the floods, the overall impact of the flooding was small.
Once past political competition is accounted for, approximately 4% of the 11 percentage point
increase in turnout between the 2008 and 2013 general elections (i.e., from 44% to 55%) can be
attributed to the impact of the 2010-11 floods. While the floods were unlikely to have changed the
election result, they clearly shifted the behavior of those who were heavily a↵ected. For districts
above the 75th percentile of flooding (22% of the population a↵ected), for example, the impact of
the floods accounted for a 2.5 percentage point increase in turnout, roughly 17% of the increase in
turnout in these areas.
Some speculative evidence supports the hypothesis that flood exposure increased participation
via citizen learning. The e↵ect of flood damage on turnout is greatest in areas with the lowest
ex ante flood risk, which are precisely those places where citizens relatively unfamiliar with floods
would learn most about the importance of government action. We also rule out three alterna-
tive mechanisms: (1) di↵erential trends in urban areas as part of the democratization process in
Pakistan; (2) the floods merely changed the composition of the electorate due to disaster-induced
migration; and (3) incumbents simply engaged in turnout buying.
We make several scholarly contributions. First, we investigate the political economy of nat-
ural disasters in a country outside the developed world, one with fragile democratic institutions
and which is of significant strategic and policy importance. Second, we introduce a new set of
mechanisms to the study natural disasters’ political consequences. Previous research focuses on
two channels. The economic channel, which has primarily been studied in non-democracies, argues
that natural disasters create economic shocks which decrease the opportunity cost of rebellion for
citizens (and therefore increase the likelihood of rebellion), thereby increasing the responsiveness of
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the state to citizen demands (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001; Besley and Persson, 2010, 2011;
Bru¨ckner and Ciccone, 2011). The political channel, mainly investigated in established democra-
cies, argues that natural disasters provide a strong signal of a government’s type, giving citizens
the opportunity to exercise electoral accountability (e.g., Healy and Malhotra, 2010; Bechtel and
Hainmueller, 2011; Cole, Healy and Werker, 2011; Gasper and Reeves, 2011). Neither body of liter-
ature considers the possibility that the experience of the disaster and associated response may have
direct e↵ects on political participation. Third, we provide a clear example of why using natural
disasters to instrument for economic shocks can be a problematic empirical strategy for outcomes
influenced by politics. Natural disasters are not pure economic shocks; these events change many
features of the political environment, and the extent to which they do so can be influenced by
government action.
The Pakistani Floods 2010-2011: A Major Natural Disaster with
Relatively Good Response
As the flooding in Pakistan began in July 2010 almost all observers expected the disaster to take
a massive human and political toll. The scale of the 2010 floods dwarfed any Pakistani natural
disaster in recent memory, a↵ecting more than 20 million people (about 11% of the total popu-
lation), temporarily displacing more than 10 million people, and killing at least 1,879, with the
2011 floods a↵ecting another 5 million, displacing another 660,000 people, and killing at least 505
more (Dartmouth Flood Observatory (DFO), 2013; Center for Research on the Epidemiology of
Disasters (CRED), 2013). A Fall-2010 survey of 1,769 households in 29 severely flood-a↵ected dis-
tricts found that 54.8% of households reported damage to their homes, 77% reported at least one
household member with health problems, and 88% reported a significant reduction in household
income (Kirsch et al., 2012). Figure 1 shows the combined maximal extent of the 2010 and 2011
floods.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
While the scale of the disaster was unprecedented, it was not nearly as bad as many observers
predicted at the time. By mid-August the death toll from the floods was estimated to be about 1,600
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people. An editorial in The Economist on August 21 expected that number to increase dramatically,
arguing that “it is no more than the plain truth that the worst is yet to come—in terms of hunger,
disease, looting and violence as victims scramble to save themselves and their families.” Journalists
worried that the unfolding disaster would be a boon for militant organizations.4 Typical headlines
at the time described a situation in which militants could step in and win loyalty by providing
badly needed services:
• “Militant groups have 3000 volunteers working around the country.” Christian Science Mon-
itor, August 6.
• “Pakistani flood disaster gives opening to militants.” Los Angeles Times, August 10.
• “’Hardline groups step in to fill Pakistan aid vacuum.” BBC News, August 10.
• “Race to provide aid emerges between West and extremists.” Der Spiegel, August 16.
• “Pakistan’s floods: a window of opportunity for insurgents?” ABC News, September 8.
Yet none of that came to pass because, as described in detail below, there was an extremely
e↵ective response by government and civil society. The floods also did not have any substantial
impact on support for militancy, which many expected and which would have indicated a negative
e↵ect on engagement with politics through traditional channels.5 Though the death toll increased
by 20% from mid-August onward, there were no large-scale disease outbreaks, and there was little
looting or violence. When the UN Environmental Program modeled risks from a 1 in 100 year flood
in Pakistan using historical worldwide data, they predicted mortality four times greater than was
actually observed (Maskrey, 2011, 30).
Background on the Floods
The 2010 disaster was a significant outlier in Pakistan’s flood history. Figure 2 shows standardized
values for the number a↵ected, displaced, and killed for floods over the past few decades. The
upper part of the figure presents data from the International Disaster Database (EM-DAT) hosted
4Militant organizations played to this concern, with a Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) spokesman famously
o↵ering to contribute $20 million to the relief e↵ort if the Pakistani government would eschew any Western aid
(Associated Press of Pakistan (APP), 2010).
5Using an endorsement experiment we find no evidence that the floods led to increased support for militancy.
Support for militants in 2012 was actually somewhat lower in heavily flooded areas controlling for a range of geographic
and demographic variables, though the results are only modestly statistically significant. Detailed results available
from authors.
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by the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (2013) (data range 1975-2012) and the
lower graph draws on data from the Global Active Archive of Large Flood Events of the Dartmouth
Flood Observatory (DFO) (2013) (data range 1988-2012). In terms of the number a↵ected and the
number temporarily displaced, the 2010 floods were the largest in the modern history of Pakistan
by several orders of magnitude, and almost twice as devastating as the next largest flood according
to the EM-DAT.6
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
Commensurate with the devastation, the 2010-11 floods also led to an unprecedented reaction
by the central, provincial, and district governments as well as by Pakistani civil society and the
international community (Ahmed, 2010). Pakistan’s Economic A↵airs Division took the overall lead
on donor coordination, while Pakistan’s National Disaster Management Agency (NDMA) directed
and coordinated the various relief e↵orts. The NDMA maintained close working relationships with
relevant federal ministries and departments, Pakistan’s armed forces,7 and donor organizations
supporting the relief e↵orts to ensure that resources were mobilized consistent with local needs.
At the provincial level, the chief minister of each province was responsible for making sure that
various line ministries and the Provincial Disaster Management Authorities acted in concert with
each other and with the international and domestic relief e↵orts (O ce for the Coordination of
Humanitarian A↵airs (OCHA), 2010; National Disaster Management Agency, 2011).
In response to the Pakistani government’s appeal to international donors for help in responding
to the disaster, the United Nations launched its relief e↵orts calling for $460 million to provide
immediate assistance such as food, shelter, and clean water. Countries and international organiza-
tions from around the world donated money and supplies, sent specialists, and provided equipment
to supplement the Pakistani government’s relief e↵orts. According to the United Nations O ce
for the Coordination of Humanitarian A↵airs (UNOCHA) (2010), by November 2010, a total of
close to $1.792 billion had been committed in humanitarian support, the largest amount by the
United States (30.7%), followed by private individuals and organizations (17.5%) and Saudi Arabia
6The next largest was the 1992 flood which a↵ected 12.8 million, temporarily displaced 4.3 million, and killed at
least 1,446 people.
7The military deployed troops in all a↵ected areas together with 21 helicopters and 150 boats (Khan and Mughal,
2010).
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(13.5%).8
In addition, spontaneous, localized self-help e↵orts emerged during the initial phase of the crisis
and continued throughout. These included victims’ and their kin’s own e↵orts to save their belong-
ings as well as survivor-led repairs of local access roads and bridges after the floods receded. This
was in addition to an enormous civil society response that tended to spontaneously coalesce at very
local levels (mohallas, union councils, villages, etc.). Such local groups collected and distributed
truckloads of relief items. Along with non-governmental organizations they set up collection sites
for donations of goods and cash and then distributed the collected resources. Individual philan-
thropists, professional bodies, and even chambers of commerce donated money and supplies to the
victims. Scholars associated with Pakistan’s Sustainable Development Policy Institute note the
importance of these local forms of assistance, but contend that they are virtually unknown (and
thus poorly documented) beyond the local level (Shahbaz et al., 2012). Such volunteerism was
not unique to the 2010 flood; rather, it is a common feature in Pakistan’s domestic response to
major disasters. Halvorson and Hamilton (2010), for example, document extremely high levels of
volunteerism following the 2005 Kashmir earthquake.9
Together, the government’s and civil society’s e↵ort and the massive influx of foreign aid was
quite e↵ective compared to responses to previous natural disasters. The ratio of people killed to
1,000 people a↵ected from the EM-DAT data, and the ratio of deaths to 1,000 people displaced
for each flood between 1975 and 2012 from the DFO data, provide proxies for the e↵ectiveness of
the government’s response. For the 2010 flood, the ratios are 0.10 and 0.19, respectively, which is
the smallest ratio in the DFO series (1988-2012) and the seventh smallest in the EM-DAT series
(1975-2012).10 Strikingly, the 2010 ratio is only 21% of the median ratio of killed to 1,000 displaced
in the DFO data, so roughly one fifth as many people died as would have been expected given
the median response in the last 37 years. Overall, the government’s performance in handling the
immediate challenge from the 2010 floods appears to have been quite good, implying that death
and temporary migration cannot account for the large changes in political participation reported
8By April 2013, this total had increased to more than $2.653 billion with the three largest donor groups being the
United States (25.8%), private individuals and organizations (13.4%), and Japan (11.3%) (UNOCHA, 2013).
9It is also not unique to Pakistan. Scholars have documented similar behavior elsewhere in South Asia (e.g.,
Haque, 2004; Rahman, 2006; Ghosh, 2009).
10Compared to the 1992 flood, the only flood of comparable magnitude in the last 30 years, the 2010 ratio is 72%
smaller in the DFO data and 8% smaller in the EM-DAT data.
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here.11
As would be expected given the qualitative discussion above, we find no quantitative evidence
that flood-a↵ected areas su↵ered medium-term negative economic impacts relative to other areas.
Using the nationally representative survey detailed in Appendix C we found that flood exposure
had no impact on self-reported income or expenditures in 2012 and only a small negative e↵ect on
household assets, with that e↵ect concentrated in farming households.12 Moreover, using nightlight
satellite imagery and micro-data from two waves of the Punjab Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey
(MICS), one before and one after the floods, we find little evidence that the 2010-11 floods led to
di↵erential economic changes across the flood gradient.13
Data Sources and Measurements
We leverage three data sources in our analysis: (1) geocoded data on the floods; (2) constituency
level results from the 2002, 2008, and 2013 National and Provincial Assembly elections; and (3) a
range of geo-spatial variables that predict ex ante flood risk. Appendix C describes the original
survey of Pakistan we conducted in early 2012 which is referenced in the text but not part of the
main analyses presented here. Summary statistics of all variables for each data set are provided in
Appendix Table A.1.
Data Sources
Geocoded Flood Data
Geo-spatial data on the 2010 and 2011 floods come from the United Nations Institute for Training
and Research’s (UNITAR) Operational Satellite Applications Program (UNOSAT) (United Nations
Institute for Training and Research, 2003). These data combine multiple di↵erent sources and are
the most precise data we know of on those floods, providing estimates of flood extent at 100m⇥100m
resolution. We overlapped various UNOSAT images to generate a layer of maximal flood extent in
2010, 2011, and 2012.
11For comparison, Hurricane Katrina killed 1,833 people in the Gulf Coast in 2005 even though many fewer people
were directly a↵ected (approximately 500,000 according to the EM-DAT database).
12Results available from authors.
13Results available from authors.
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Electoral Data
We collected constituency-level voting data published by the Election Commission of Pakistan
(ECP) from the 2002, 2008, and 2013 National Assembly (NA) and Provincial Assembly (PA)
elections. Both assemblies consist of members elected in single-member first-past-the-post elections
at the constituency level (272 for the NA and 577 for the PA in the four main provinces) with a
number of seats reserved for women and minorities (70 in the NA) that are allocated among parties
according to a proportional representation scheme. Most candidates align with a party during the
campaign, and those a liations are recorded in the voting data, but some run as independents and
a liate with a party for coalition formation purposes after the election is complete. Candidates in
the 2013 election campaigns combined appeals to national issues and party platforms with locality-
specific appeals and promises of patronage, with the mix varying by candidate. The candidates’
2013 appeals are commonly understood to have been more focused on national policies than in
previous elections.
For each constituency we recorded the number of registered voters, total number of votes cast,
total number of valid votes cast, and the number of votes received by each candidate on the
ballot. In the analysis below we focus on PA constituencies which are substantially smaller than
NA constituencies and therefore entail less aggregation of our flood data. All core results are
substantively similar at the NA level, though less precisely estimated in some cases.
Treatment Variable: Flood Exposure
We measure flood exposure with objective measures based on geo-spatial data. Figure 1 shows the
combined maximum flood extents in 2010 and 2011 overlaid on a map of Pakistan with the 216
tehsils in which we surveyed highlighted in grey.14
Using the 2010 Landscan gridded (5km ⇥ 5km resolution) population data (Oak Ridge National
Laboratory, 2008), we calculate the percent of the population exposed to the floods for each of the
409 tehsils and each of the 577 single-member PA constituencies.15 The UNOSAT data under-
estimate the floods’ impacts in steep areas where the flood waters did not spread out enough to
14The tehsil is the third level administrative unit in Pakistan, below provinces and districts.
15We also calculated the percent of area flooded for each of the geographic units. The two measures are highly
correlated (r = 0.85) and all reported results are qualitatively similar using the area-based instead of the population-
based measure.
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be identified with overhead imagery but where contemporaneous accounts clearly show there was
major damage at the bottom of river valleys. In Upper Dir district in KPK, for example, the UN-
OSAT data show no flooding. Contemporaneous media accounts and survey-based measurements,
however, clearly indicate the floods did a great deal of damage to structures that were placed well
above the normal high-water mark but still very close to rivers (e.g., Agency for Technical Coop-
eration and Development, 2010). If the floods had an impact on citizen attitudes and behavior, as
we hypothesize, then this kind of measurement error will attenuate our estimate of flood impacts
because we are counting places as having low values on the treatment where the floods actually
had substantial e↵ects.
Outcome Variables: Political Behavior
Based on the constituency-level electoral returns, we construct two measures of political behavior:
turnout and candidate vote shares. Turnout is defined as the proportion of total votes cast out of
all registered voters in a constituency. All results are robust to measuring turnout as only based on
valid votes cast out of all registered voters in a constituency. Candidate vote shares are calculated
by dividing the number of votes for each candidate by the number of valid votes in the constituency.
Control Variables
In addition to the regression-specific controls highlighted in the following section, we include two
main groups of control variables in all specifications: a measure of ex ante flood risk and geographic
controls.
Ex Ante Flood Risk
We use risk data developed by the UN Environmental Program (UNEP) to measure ex ante flood
risk. These data estimate risk based on hydrological models combined with data on historical
disasters, ground cover, rainfall, soil type, and topography. The UNEP data estimate flood risk on
a 0 (low) to 5 (extreme) scale for 10km⇥10km grid cells worldwide.16 Since these grid cells are too
large to nest neatly within PA constituency boundaries we estimate the area-weighted flood risk
16For details on the methodology see Herold and Mouton (2011).
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for each constituency. If 50% of the area of a constituency was in a 0 cell and 50% was in a 1 cell,
then the constituency would receive a value of .5 on for ex ante flood risk, and so on.
Geographic Controls
In addition to the ex ante flood risk, we include in all our regressions the following four control
variables for each geographic unit: distance from the unit centroid to the nearest major river, an
indicator for units bordering a major river, the mean elevation, and the standard deviation of a
unit’s standard deviation. Major rivers include the Indus and its main arms (i.e., Chenab, Jhelum,
Kabul, Ravi, and Sutlij). Because there was significant flooding in 2012 in a few areas though not
nearly so extensive at in 2010-11, less than 10% of constituencies saw any meaningful flooding in
2012, we also control from flooding in 2012 in all specifications.
Empirical Strategy
Identification
Our identification strategy for assessing flood impacts throughout the paper relies on the observa-
tion that whether and how much any individual or region was a↵ected by the floods had a large
random component due to topographical factors, levy breaks, and strategic dam destructions which
had unpredictable consequences on subsequent flows (e.g., Waraich, 2010). Once we control for ob-
servables that citizens could have used to predict flood exposure, and thus may have impacted
economic outcomes or settlement patterns—risk estimates based on topography and hydrology,
distance to major rivers, elevation, and steepness of terrain—the remaining variance in flooding
should be conditionally independent of other factors influencing the outcomes we study.
The correlation between ex ante risk and flooding in 2010-11 is modest at best (see Figure 3,
which plots average flood risk against observed exposure in 2010-11). Each column reports a
di↵erent level of geographic aggregation: tehsils, NA constituencies, and PA constituencies. The
top row shows exposure measured in terms of proportion of area exposed and the bottom row
shows the proportion of the population exposed. Across all six scatter plots it is clear that there is
tremendous variance in flood exposure at all but the lowest levels of flood risk. Only 10-12% of the
variance in the proportion of the population exposed in 2010-11 could have been predicted with a
13
cubic polynomial model of ex ante flood risk.
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE
Estimation Strategy
Our estimation strategy at the constituency level is inspired by two observations. First, conditional
on a combination of regional fixed-e↵ects and constituency-level geographic controls, we can isolate
the impact of local variation in flood intensity on electoral turnout. In doing so, we need to control
for a range of locality-specific confounders. We might worry, for example, that it is easier for
politicians to deliver patronage to constituencies close to rivers (which are most likely to be flooded)
through a combination of water management projects and prior flood relief, making them more
likely to turn out. To avoid confounding flood exposure with fixed characteristics of constituencies
we control for a range of geographic factors. We also show that our results are consistent within
subsets that are more similar in proximity to rivers.
Second, controlling for past turnout at the locality level can help estimate the impact of events on
voting. In developed democracies individual turnout decisions are highly consistent from election to
election (Fowler, 2006; Denny and Doyle, 2008), and past turnout in an area is an excellent predictor
of future turnout in that area (Fujiwara, Meng and Vogl, 2013). Given that fact, we follow the
logic of Gerber and Green (2000) and Gerber, Green and Larimer (2008), who use lagged dependent
variable models to improve precision in their estimates of the marginal impact of exogenous events.
In their studies, the exogenous events were experimental treatments. In our case, it is the variance
in flooding conditional on ex ante flood risk and our geographic controls.
In Pakistan, individual turnout decisions are likely not as consistent as in more developed
polities, so there is no obvious right way to execute this strategy. In particular, the 2002 and
2008 elections were held under very di↵erent circumstances with di↵erent configurations of parties.
The 2002 election was held to transition out of a military dictatorship and a number of prominent
politicians, including the current prime minister, were bared from running. The 2008 election was
the first completely democratic contest, but the results were heavily influenced by the assassination
of Benazir Bhutto, the leader of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), two weeks before the originally
planned vote, and by the subsequent delay to allow the PPP to choose another leader. Since the
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array of parties in the 2002 and 2008 elections were not obviously comparable to those in the 2013
election we show all results three ways: (a) without controls for previous voting; (b) with controls
for trends from 2002 to 2008; and (c) with controls for levels in 2002 and 2008. Note that controlling
for trends imposes the condition that the relationship between voting in 2008 and voting in 2013
is symmetric with the relationship between voting in 2002 and voting in 2013. It is therefore a less
flexible specification than controlling for levels in both elections.
Our preferred specification is therefore:
y2013 = ↵+  1Fi +  2Ri +  1y2008 +  2y2002 +  d +BXi + ✏i (1)
where y2013 is a measure of voting behavior (turnout, vote choice) in the 2013 election, Fi is
a measure of flood impact, Ri is the UNEP measure of ex ante flood risk, the y2008 and y2002
variables capture the voting behavior in question in the previous two elections, and Xi is our vector
of geo-spatial controls plus the proportion of population a↵ected in the smaller 2012 floods that
occurred before the 2013 general elections.  d is a unit fixed e↵ect for the division, a defunct
administrative unit that was larger than the district but smaller than the province. We control for
the 27 divisions instead of districts because, outside of Punjab, PA constituencies are often aligned
with district boundaries or contain multiple districts.17 The geo-spatial controls plus division
fixed-e↵ects account for 66.2% of the variance in the percentage of the population a↵ected in PA
constituencies. We cluster standard errors at the district level to account for the high probability
that the cross-constituency variance in turnout changes is correlated within districts as campaign
activities in Pakistan are generally managed at the district level.
If the impact of the floods on electoral behavior works through the suggested theoretical mech-
anisms, as opposed to a response to service delivery or an economic shock, we would expect two
patterns:
1. There should be no consistent impact on the incumbent or the main opposition party’s vote
share; and
2. The impact should be strongest in places that where genuinely surprised by the flooding.
1757% of districts have four or fewer PA constituencies. Hence, using district fixed e↵ects would essentially limit
our results to being estimated o↵ the large districts. For transparency all main results are shown without any unit
fixed-e↵ects, province fixed-e↵ects, and division fixed-e↵ects.
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Put more starkly, none of the theoretical mechanisms necessarily predict changes in vote shares,
but they do indicate that surprised constituencies will have higher turnout due to the greater infor-
mational and psychological impact of the floods. To assess the prediction (1) we re-run Equation 1
on the national and the provincial level incumbent vote shares. To assess prediction (2) we interact
our flood exposure measures with the UNEP measure of ex ante flood risk, resulting in the following
estimation equation:
y2013 = ↵+  1Fi +  2Ri +  3(Fi ⇥Ri) +  1y2008 +  2y2002 +  d +BXi +CPi + ✏i. (2)
Here  3 captures the change in the impact of flooding on di↵erent voting outcomes as one moves
across levels of ex ante risk. For thoroughness we estimate both the continuous interaction between
flood exposure and ex ante risk as well as that between flood exposure and a dummy variable for
whether flood risk is greater than 1 on the 0-5 UNEP scale (roughly the median of the scale).
To be clear, this approach cannot separately identify the e↵ect of response from that of harm,
similar to other papers in this literature. We provide suggestive evidence that the result is not a
simple gratitude reaction in Appendix B, where we show that controlling for relief spending does
little to attenuate the estimated impact of flood exposure on turnout. Those results must be taken
as suggestive, however, as the assignment of relief spending was not, obviously, independent of
harm and relief spending was recorded at higher levels of spatial aggregation than voting.
Results
In this section we report the main results on turnout and then show they are robust: (1) across
sub-samples; (2) to a quadratic functional form; and (3) a placebo test. We also provide evidence
on the impact of flooding on vote share. Overall we find that flood exposure significantly and
positively increased turnout in the 2013 elections. We then turn to more speculative evidence on
the mechanisms, showing that these e↵ects are strongest in constituencies that had the lowest ex
ante flood risk and therefore experienced the strongest shocks.
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Impact on Electoral Behavior
Turnout
Our main results are based on o cial election data recorded 21-33 months after the floods. Table 1
shows the impact of flood exposure on constituency-level turnout in the 2013 PA elections. All
regressions include controls for ex ante flood risk and geographic controls. To make clear how
controlling for past turnout impacts the conditional correlation between flood exposure and turnout
Columns (1)-(3) do not include controls for past turnout, Columns (4)-(6) control for the change
in turnout in the constituency from 2002 to 2008, and Columns (7)-(9) control independently for
the levels of turnout in 2002 and 2008. Within each block we show the results with no fixed
e↵ects, with province fixed e↵ects to partial out any uncontrolled heterogeneity across the first-
level administrative sub-unit which in Pakistan is responsible for most service delivery, and division
fixed-e↵ects to control for such factors at a finer geographic scale. Estimates are fairly stable and
consistent across di↵erent specifications. In our preferred specification, Column (9), increasing the
share of the population exposed to the flood from 0% to 100% increased turnout by 6.6 percentage
points. This is a substantively large e↵ect, given that the mean turnout change between 2008
and 2013 was 10.3 percentage points. Further, the e↵ect size represents over one-half a standard
deviation of the dependent variable.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
Examining how the coe cients change across specifications is helpful for understanding potential
biases. It is possible that places which show flooding would be expected to experience greater
changes in turnout than the places that do not, perhaps due to past experiences or issues related
to geography. Some of this concern is addressed by controlling for ex ante flood risk, but one might
also want to control for previous trends in voting behavior. Comparing across specifications with
the same fixed e↵ects (e.g., Column 1 vs. Columns 4 and 7) shows that controlling for trends makes
the results substantively larger, which is the opposite of what would happen if the main result were
identifying either reversion to mean from previous trends or some kind of secular tendency in places
likely to be flooded.
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In standardized terms a one standard deviation increase in the proportion of a constituency’s
population flooded (0.146) led to a 0.96 percentage point increase in turnout. This is a modest
average increase in electoral mobilization. Compared to recent U.S. presidential elections this
increase in absolute terms is roughly 1/6th of the 5.4 percentage point increase in turnout between
2000 and 2004, and greater than half the 1.4 percentage point increase in turnout between 2004 and
2008, typically attributed to an unusually motivated electorate turning out in support of a historic
candidate. The fact that we find no significant flood e↵ect on the number of registered voters,
but a significant impact on the number of votes cast, further supports our theoretical argument
(see Appendix Table B.5, which shows components of turnout for di↵erent subsets of the data).18
The increase in turnout is not due to lower registration but due to an increase in the number of
votes cast in flooded constituencies, which is what we would expect if the floods increased civic
engagement.19 Since controlling for past levels is more flexible then controlling for trends and is
more conservative (in that it yields smaller estimates) all subsequent results include controls for
levels.
Sensitivity to Sub-Samples and Functional Form
One potential concern with the main result is that it may be an artifact of pre-existing di↵erences
between places in the flood plain and those outside of it. Table 2 therefore shows results for the full
sample (Columns 1-3) as well as for two subsamples: places near major rivers, which we define as
constituencies bordering major rivers and ones immediately adjacent to those (Columns 4-6), and
only constituencies bordering major rivers (Columns 7-9). This essentially restricts the analysis
to areas that were proximate to major water sources in case the e↵ects we observe are driven by
systematic di↵erences between such places and those further away that are not accounted for by our
controls. Without fixed e↵ects or with province fixed e↵ects the results become substantively smaller
but remain statistically significant as the sample is restricted (Columns 1 vs. 4/7 or Columns 2 vs.
5/8), suggesting that some share of the main result in those specifications was driven by underlying
di↵erences between places in the flood plain and those outside of it. However, once division fixed
18Note that in the appendix table the coe cients on votes cast and registration are sensitive to the fixed e↵ects
being used, which is not the case for the overall turnout numbers. Once province or division fixed e↵ects are included
votes cast increased using either measure. Registered voters drop insignificantly with province fixed e↵ects and
increase insignificantly with division fixed e↵ects).
19Put di↵erently this is not a change in turnout driven by changes in the denominator.
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e↵ects are included (Columns 3 vs. 6/9) these di↵erences disappear and all estimates are similar in
magnitude and statistical significance across subsets. This consistency provides evidence that the
e↵ect of flood exposure is identified o↵ variation in flooding across areas with similar propensity to
flood and not o↵ di↵erences between constituencies closer to potential flooding sources (those in
the flood plain) compared to those further away.
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
A second potential concern with these results is that there may be some significant non-linearity
in the relationship between flood exposure and turnout. To test for that possibility Appendix
Table B.1 adds a squared term for flood exposure to all the specifications from Table 2. The
squared term is rarely significant in any subset and while the test for joint significance of the
linear and squared terms rejects the null of no joint e↵ect (p < .05 in all specifications), the actual
improvement in r-squared is quite modest. Marginal e↵ects calculations in the appendix show
that at high levels of flood exposure the marginal impact of flood exposure is substantively large
and strongly statistically significant in almost all specifications. It seems unlikely that our linear
specification is leading to erroneous inference.
Placebo Test
If our identifying assumptions about isolating the exogenous component of the 2010-11 floods are
valid, then there should be no consistent relationship between flood exposure in 2010-11 and turnout
in previous years. Table 3 shows the conditional correlation between flood exposure and turnout
in 2002, turnout in 2008, and the trend across samples (Panel A vs. Panel B vs. Panel C), with
di↵erent types of fixed e↵ects.
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
The placebo test is fairly clean but there is a statistically significant negative correlation between
the change in turnout from 2002 to 2008 and the level of flooding in 2010-11 in the full sample
for the fixed e↵ects models. That relationship is statistically insignificant and becomes smaller
in magnitude as the sample is restricted (Columns 7-9 in Panel A vs. Panels B/C). In Panel A
the coe cients are negative and weakly significant while in Panels B and C they are negative and
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statistically insignificant. These patterns suggest that the flood treatment is not simply capturing
an omitted aspect of the constituencies that is also positively related to turnout. It is particularly
informative that in the model with division fixed e↵ects the placebo regression on past changes
shows a conditional correlation that gets closer to zero as the sample is restricted, whereas in
the same model for 2013 turnout there is no change across subsets (Table 2 Columns 3/6/9).
It is therefore unlikely that some long-run relationship between flood risk and voting patterns is
responsible for our findings.
Vote Share
We next test whether partisan swings drive the result. Table 4 presents the e↵ect of the floods on
major party vote shares in the 2013 PA elections. Panels A-C show the estimates for three di↵erent
outcomes: the provincial incumbent party’s vote share (i.e., the PPP in Balochistan and Sindh,
the PML-N in Punjab, and the ethnic Awami National Party (ANP) in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa
(KPK)) (Panel A), the national ruling party (i.e. the PPP) (Panel B), and the main opposition’s
vote share (i.e., the PML-N) (Panel C). The columns indicate di↵erent administrative subsets of
constituencies: Column 1 presents the results for all PA constituencies in Pakistan’s four regular
provinces, Column 2 for the two smaller provinces Balochistan and KPK, Column 3 for Punjab,
the largest province, and Column 4 for Sindh province. For succinctness we show the results with
and without division fixed e↵ects. All regressions include geographic controls.20
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
We see no consistent evidence that the floods led to an increase in vote share for the ruling
provincial parties, the ruling national party, or the main national opposition. The e↵ects are
inconsistent across subsets and fail to reach conventional levels of statistical significance once fixed
e↵ects are included. It therefore seems highly unlikely that the turnout results completely reflect a
partisan response which rewarded those in power for e↵ectively addressing the floods.
The implications of the fact that the incumbent party was neither punished nor rewarded
after such a historic event for theories of democratic accountability is a di cult question in this
20Results are almost identical if we include political controls: the outcome variable in 2008, the degree of political
competition in the 2008 elections, a series of dummy variables indicating which major party represented the con-
stituency between 2008 and 2013, and interaction terms between the party dummies and political competition. The
only substantive di↵erence of note is that the coe cient in Panel B (Column 1) is about 10% smaller.
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context. The challenge is that the national ruling party at the time of the floods was the Pakistan
People’s Party (PPP). They were responsible for working with the Army to coordinate relief by
national level bodies and relief from international organizations. However, the relief e↵ort within
provinces was managed by the provincial governments. In Punjab (roughly half the population)
the provincial government in charge of relief was the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N). In
Sindh and Balochistant (roughly 30% of the population) and Balochistan it was the PPP. In Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa (KP, roughly 20% of the population) it was the Awami National Party—a secular
Pashtun nationalist party—in 2010 and a new national party, the Pakistan-Tarek-Insaf, in 2013.
Given that complexity it would have been hard for a voter to know which party to reward or punish,
akin to the concept of “clarity of responsibility” (Powell Jr. and Whiten, 1993). It is impossible to
tell from our data whether the lack of partisan swing reflects the ambiguous responsibility in this
context or a general failure to reward good performance.
Evidence on Mechanisms
Turning to mechanisms, we examine whether the impact of flood exposure on turnout varies with
ex ante flood risk in ways that are consistent with the learning mechanism. As explained above,
we would expect the treatment to have the largest e↵ect where the floods “suprised” people. To
assess this we re-estimate the models shown in Table 1, but include an interaction term between
the UNEP ex ante flood risk and our measures of flood exposure. Table 5 presents the full results
two di↵erent ways. Panel A shows the results across di↵erent sets of controls for the continuous
interaction between flood exposure and ex ante risk. Panel B shows how the slope of the relationship
shifts for places above and below a flood risk of 1 on a 0-5 scale, approximately the median of the
risk distribution.
INSERT TABLE 5 AND FIGURE 4 HERE
Once controls for the level of turnout in the past two elections are included (Columns 7-9) it
is clear that the flood impact on turnout varies by the ex ante flood risk of a constituency: the
lower the ex ante flood risk of a constituency, the greater the impact of the floods on turnout. In
very low risk (ex ante flood risk = 0) constituencies, moving across the possible range of proportion
of population flooded led to a substantively large 11.5 percentage point increase in turnout. In
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standardized terms a one s.d. increase in flood exposure (.146) predicts a 1.7 percentage point
increase in turnout in low risk areas, almost three times the average treatment e↵ect in Table 1
(Column 9). For constituencies at the highest level of risk (ex ante flood risk = 5), however,
there is no longer a statistically significant relationship between flood exposure and turnout. To
illustrate the relationship visually Figure 4 shows the average marginal e↵ects of a unit increase
in flood exposure for di↵erent levels of ex ante flood risk from our preferred specification. We
interpret these results as modest evidence that flood exposure had a greater impact where people
were surprised by the flooding.
It is important, however, not to overstate the magnitude of the interaction e↵ect. As Figure 4
makes clear the di↵erence between the treatment e↵ect from flood exposure at very high levels of
risk vs. very low levels of risk is not statistically significant. To avoid assuming linearity in the
interaction term, consider the regression in Panel B where we compare the slope of the coe cient
on flood exposure in places below 1 on the risk scale with places above it. The slope shift is only
statistically significant in one specification, but it is negative in all but one and not particularly close
to zero once we control for levels of past turnout. As shown in Panel B (Columns 7-9) the marginal
e↵ect of flood exposure is always larger in low-risk areas, but is not statistically significantly so in
our preferred specification (t = 1.47).
In Appendix C we provide survey evidence captured 5-17 months post-flood and 14 months
pre-election that indicates a behavioral change among flood-a↵ected individuals in so far as they
seem to have invested more time and e↵ort in acquiring political knowledge and become more
supportive of aggressive political action.21 Given that the survey data are cross-sectional, we are
unable to make strong causal inferences. Nonetheless, we include information about the survey
in the appendix to better elucidate the inductive reasoning that generated the predictions in this
paper.
Overall, our results suggest that turnout in the 2013 PA elections significantly increased across
the flood gradient and did so more strongly in places that had a low ex ante flood risk than in
21The survey results, in fact, generated the theoretical predictions in this paper. We thought the flood might
influence support for aggressive political action/participation and so built the vignette experiment described in
Appendix C to test that hypothesis and fielded it in Spring 2012. Shapiro gave a talk on April 6, 2013, presenting
results from that survey showing that those exposed to the flooding had more aggressive attitudes about demanding
government services. During the talk several Pakistani scholars argued that if the results in the vignette experiment
did capture aggressiveness about demanding government services then we should see increased turnout in the 2013
election. As the analysis above makes clear that appears to have been correct.
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areas with a higher flood risk. This heterogeneity together with the lack of consistent evidence of
partisan response, provides empirical evidence that is inconsistent with predictions from standard
political accountability models, but is in line with our learning mechanism.
Robustness
We explore three alternative explanations for our findings to assess the robustness of the conditional
correlation between flood exposure and turnout. First, we show that the result is not driven by
di↵erential response to flooding in urban areas. Second, we provide evidence that the e↵ect is
unlikely to be driven by compositional changes wherein people with a low propensity to vote left
flood-a↵ected areas and/or those with a high propensity to do so moved in. Third, we show that
controlling for the distribution of food and shelter relief in the aftermath of the flood does not
substantively change the results. This suggests that the increased political engagement in flood-
a↵ected PA constituencies are not an artefact of citizens rewarding aid spending.
Do the Results Reflect an Urban E↵ect?
One concern is that rapid changes in voting behavior that result from democratization are driving
the result.22 Voter participation tends to increase dramatically during democratization and the
changes may be especially large in urban areas that had historically experienced low turnout. In
Pakistan many of these urban areas are concentrated around the Indus River. Hence it is possible
that these democratization factors are driving the correlation between flood exposure and turnout.
While controlling for past turnout and trends would partially address this concern, a more direct
test is to look for di↵erences in the conditional correlation between flooding and turnout in urban
areas vs. other areas.
To do so we use Landscan population data to classify constituencies as ‘urban’ if their population
density is above the 75th percentile of the population density distribution, approximately 921 people
per square kilometer.23 Appendix Table B.2 shows that the conditional correlation between flooding
and turnout is in fact weaker in urban areas. In the full sample (Columns 1-3), the conditional
22We thank an anonymous reviewer for making this valuable point.
23For reference this is approximately the density of Tuscon, Arizona or Reno, Nevada according to the 2010 census.
Using the median population density of 403 people per square kilometer, approximately 23 the population density of
sprawling Atlanta, Georgia, does not substantially alter the results.
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correlation between flooding and turnout is close to zero in urban areas but strongly positive
everywhere else. Once the sample is restricted to constituencies near rivers (Columns 4-6) or just
neighboring rivers (Columns 7-9), the e↵ect in urban areas is statistically indistinguishable from
that in other areas. Importantly, urban areas share common support with rural areas on flood
exposure, so the estimate of the interaction term is valid. It is therefore extremely unlikely that
our results are driven by the fact that urban areas were more likely to be flooded and saw greater
turnout increases due to the natural progress of democratization.
Is This Just a Compositional E↵ect?
An immediate concern with any analysis of the impact of a natural disaster which is not based on
individual-level panel data is that we may simply be picking up a compositional e↵ect. If people
who moved out after the floods were systematically less likely to vote than those who stayed put (or
moved in), then the changes we are attributing to the flood’s impact on individual civic engagement
could actually be an artefact of those migration decisions.
This possibility seems unlikely to drive our results for several reasons. First, there is no evidence
in surveys designed to study migration that there were significant, permanent population shifts in
Pakistan due to the 2010-11 floods, either to or from flood-a↵ected districts (Mueller, Gray and
Kosec, 2013). Less than 2% of those reporting their village was hit in the 2010 or 2011 floods in a
nationally representative panel study were living in a di↵erent village than in 2001.24 That would
be inadequate to cause e↵ects of the size we observe.
Second, the particulars of Pakistan’s voting system also make it unlikely that compositional
changes are driving the results. The major door-to-door voter registration e↵ort by the Electoral
Commission of Pakistan for the 2013 election occurred from August 22 to November 30, 2011
(mostly after the 2011 floods). Voters were registered at the address on their national identity card
and anyone not at home during the door-to-door drive could register until March 22, 2013 at their
local electoral commission o ce by providing a national identity card. Because changing the address
on one’s national identity card is a relatively cumbersome process (it requires visiting an o ce
with either proof of property ownership or a certificate from a local government representative),
many people choose to vote where they were registered rather than changing that address. This
24Private communication with the authors of Mueller, Gray and Kosec (2013).
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registration process means that if those who moved out were disproportionately inclined not to
vote, then their registration would likely remain in flood-a↵ected areas (there would be, after all,
no reason for them to shift their registration if they do not plan to vote). This would introduce a
downward bias, making our main estimates of the e↵ects of the floods on turnout conservative.
We conduct three tests to assess whether compositional e↵ects drive the results. First, we
replicate Tables 1 and 2 using (valid votes/registered voters) as an alternative measure of turnout.
As Appendix Tables B.3 and B.4 show all results remain substantially the same. This suggests that
neither a sudden influx of highly competent voters (i.e., those more likely to cast valid votes) to
flooded areas, nor a mass departure of incompetent ones (i.e., those less likely to case valid votes)
from such areas is driving the result. Second, we show that the results are unlikely to be driven
by changing registration rates (i.e., out migration post-flood lowering the denominator in flooded
areas). Appendix Table B.5 shows that registration is inconsistently correlated with flooding across
di↵erent specifications and is positively correlated with flood exposure in our preferred specification
(Column 9).
While we cannot rule out a compositional e↵ect without better information on migration pat-
terns, the aggregate migration figures and nature of the registration process make it unlikely. We
provide suggestive evidence from our 2012 survey to generate a proxy measure for migration and
include it in our core turnout regressions. We first calculate the number of respondents reported
su↵ering from flood damage who lived in 2012 in places that were not a↵ected by the 2010-11 floods.
If we assume that all those reporting any damage who live in una↵ected districts migrated because
of the flood, then we estimate that 4.6% of the population in una↵ected districts are migrants from
the flood-a↵ected regions and that a total of 2.05% of Pakistan’s population migrated as a result
of flood damage. This is surely an overestimate as many of those who report being a↵ected but
live in districts with no flooding either moved for other reasons, are referring to damage su↵ered
by kin, or answered based on damage su↵ered from monsoon rains in the summer of 2010. Still, we
can use our estimates of migration to benchmark the di↵erence in electoral behavior attributable
to the impact of the flood.
The simplest way to do so is to estimate the migration rates for the 61 districts in our survey
(recall the sample was designed to be district representative) and include the estimates of the
proportion of migrants in a district in our core regressions. If people who moved out were less likely
25
to vote, then we should see a negative conditional correlation between the number of migrants in
una↵ected communities and our outcome variables. Panel A of Appendix Table B.6 shows that
controlling for migration generally has little impact on the correlation of interest in the full sample
(Columns 1-3) compared to the main results, but could account for roughly half of the flood exposure
e↵ect in places neighboring rivers (Columns 7-9). Instead of controlling for migration directly—
since our measure of migration is restricted to a subset of constituencies and does not capture
in-migration by people una↵ected very well—we can also estimate our baseline regressions for the
PA constituencies that we estimate did not receive any migrants using our imperfect definition (i.e.,
those in districts we surveyed that were either clearly hit by the floods or that had no one report
flood exposure). As Panel B shows the core results remain substantially unchanged within that
sub-sample. Hence, it seems very unlikely that we are simply capturing the impact of di↵erential
migration.
Does Increased Turnout Reflect a Reward for Relief E↵orts?
The final concern is that the turnout e↵ects merely reflect “turnout buying” arising from relief
spending (Nichter, 2008). To measure relief spending we used district-level data on food and shelter
disbursements provided by the National Disaster Management Authority. We then constructed a
standardized additive index of total aid disbursement from eight categories of shelter relief and
the standardized amount of food relief.25 Note that our aid data are at the district level and may
therefore mask intra-district variation in disbursements that are correlated with constituency-level
flood exposure, so this is not as strong a test as one might like.26
We first examine how our baseline results in Table 2 change if we control directly for relief
e↵orts at the district level. If relief e↵ort is the driving factor underlying our results, we should
expect the inclusion of a variable for total flood relief to drastically attenuate the coe cient of our
flood treatment. We find little evidence of this. Appendix Table B.7 shows that controlling for
total flood relief has little impact on the size of our coe cient estimates of interest. Controlling
for aid spending does attenuate the coe cient on population exposed due to its correlation with
25The eight categories of shelter aid were: tents, tarpaulins, ropes, toolkits, blankets, kitchen kits, bedding, and
plastic mats. The data record the count of each item distributed at the district level.
26Higher resolution aid data were collected during the recovery e↵ort but unfortunately erased when the NDMA
changed its website and computer systems in early 2013. Personal communication with NDMA o cials, November
15, 2013.
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aid distribution in the full sample (i.e., R-squared = .25 in a regression of total flood relief on
population exposed without division fixed e↵ects and .42 including division fixed e↵ects), but the
resulting attenuation is generally less than 10 percent of the e↵ect size. It therefore seems unlikely
that gratitude for preferential aid spending in the immediate aftermath of the floods is driving the
results.
We also added total flood relief to our models of major party vote shares.27 Again, we find
little evidence that voters rewarded the national or provincial ruling party for what was generally
considered to be an e↵ective response (particularly compared to previous floods in Pakistan) or
disproportionate flood relief. Our estimates of flood exposure remain almost identical in size and
inconsistent across specifications. Moreover, the coe cient estimates of total flood relief have no
consistent sign and are generally insignificant, providing little evidence for a patronage e↵ect.
Conclusion
We have shown that in the case of the 2010-11 Pakistani floods—the largest floods in the last 20
years in Pakistan—a major natural disaster led to greater political engagement. In early-2012,
5-17 months after the most recent floods, citizens exposed to the disaster knew more about politics,
reflecting a greater investment in acquiring political information. In May 2013, 14 months later,
citizens in those same areas turned out to vote at substantially higher rates compared to otherwise-
similar una↵ected constituencies, exactly as one would have expected given the survey results.28
Examining underlying mechanisms, three pieces of evidence point toward the previously de-
scribed psychological and social changes in the aftermath of natural disasters (e.g., Bardo, 1978;
Bolin and Stanford, 1998; Toya and Skidmore, 2014; Rodriguez, Trainor and Quarantelli, 2006;
Levine and Thompson, 2004; Vollhardt, 2009). First, the survey results are consistent with cit-
izens becoming more politically engaged in hard-hit areas. Second, the e↵ects described above
were particularly strong in the subset of places that had a low ex ante risk of being flooded (i.e.,
those places that were genuinely surprised by the flood). Third, we found only modest evidence
that these changes in electoral participation reflect citizens rewarding politicians for their relatively
e↵ective handling of the disaster. Instead, the data suggest to us that flood exposure can highlight
27Results available from authors.
28And as our Pakistani colleagues did expect in April 2013, as noted in section 5.
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the importance of a responsive government and community, which creates incentives to invest in
political knowledge and to become more politically engaged.
Overall, this is good news for policymakers worried that natural disasters in weakly institu-
tionalized countries undermine democratic institutions. Exposure to natural disasters that are
well-handled might actually highlight the necessity of governmental services and foster citizens’
political engagement. Future research should assess this possibility further in the following three
ways. First, it is important to test more directly the underlying psychological and social mecha-
nisms. Second, we need to assess whether the increase in political engagement we identified actually
leads to policy changes, such as the provision of local goods and services across the flood boundary.
Finally, an open question is how long these e↵ects last. What we know now is that the floods had
enduring political e↵ects two years on, but evidence from work in Germany suggests we may expect
e↵ects even long after that (Bechtel and Hainmueller, 2011).
From a policy perspective, the increase in political engagement we observed in Pakistan most
likely depended on a relatively e↵ective government response, one that was far more e↵ective than
outsiders expected it would be. Policymakers can do a great deal to enable such responses.29 By
reallocating modest funds from their current investments in response, donors could support regular
exercises in coordinating large-scale aid flows with emergency management authorities in disaster-
prone areas. In doing so they would create the social and organizational ties that can enhance
cooperation in the wake of a disaster.30
Our results also speak to three additional literatures. First, these results raise questions about
the interpretation of a broad set of papers that use natural disasters as a source of variation in
economic conditions that is plausibly exogenous to political factors (e.g., Miguel, Satyanath and
Sergenti, 2004; Burke and Leigh, 2010; Bru¨ckner and Ciccone, 2011; Chaney, 2013). The economic
impact of disasters can obviously be highly contingent on government response. And even when
that response e↵ectively minimizes economic impacts, we can still observe large changes in citizens’
political attitudes and behavior. Thus, the exclusion restriction in a number of recent papers on
political liberalization and democratic transition is clearly violated in at least one important case
29Andrabi and Das (2010) show that international aid helped significantly in the wake of Pakistan’s devastating
2005 earthquake, for example.
30Establishing those ties is a key reason allied militaries regularly exercise together and there is no reason to think
similar dynamics do not apply in the disaster response field.
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and may be in others.
Second, we provide valuable evidence on the question of what drives governments from patron-
client systems—which focus on providing targeted benefits to supporters at the cost of services
with larger collective benefits—to programmatic systems focused on e↵ective service provision.
Most work on the subject has focused on elite bargaining and has left unexamined how changes
in citizens’ preferences impact elite incentives (e.g., Shefter, 1977; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012).
Yet, as Besley and Burgess (2002) show theoretically and empirically, more informed and politically
active electorates create strong incentives for governments to deliver services.31 The evidence from
Pakistan, a country long considered a stronghold of patronage politics, suggests that exogenous
events can create just such changes in the electorate.
Finally, our results are relevant to the emerging academic literature on the impact of natural
disasters on conflict and to government decision makers planning disaster response. Scholars in
this literature typically find a positive relationship between natural disasters and conflict (see e.g.,
Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti, 2004; Brancati, 2007; Ghimire and Ferreira, 2013), though there
are exceptions (Berghold and Lujala, 2012). These findings worry many as climate change is
predicted by most models to lead to a long-run increase in the incidence of severe weather-related
disasters (Burke, Hsiang and Miguel, 2013). The evidence from Pakistan suggests that e↵ective
response to such disasters can mitigate their negative political consequences. In this case, the
international community provided a great deal of post-disaster assistance which the state e↵ectively
coordinated. The net result was an increase in legal political engagement by citizens in flood-
a↵ected regions compared to non-a↵ected regions. The results thus provide micro-level evidence
that aid in the wake of natural disasters can turn them into events which enhance democracy, a
possibility consistent with the cross-national pattern identified in Ahlerup (2011), who finds that
natural disasters are correlated with democratization in countries that are substantial aid recipients.
Overall, our findings suggest enhanced investments in helping poor countries respond well to natural
disasters could yield long-run political gains in addition to their obvious economic value.
31Pande (2011) provides a review of experimental evidence showing that providing voters with information improves
electoral accountability.
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Figures
Figure 1: Maximal Composite Flood Extent in 2010 and 2011 and Surveyed Tehsils
Combined maximal flood extent of the 2010 and 2011 Pakistani floods. Grey colored tehsils indicate locations that
were sampled for the 2012 district representative survey. Flood data (area in blue) was taken from UNITAR’s
Operational Satellite Applications Programme (UNOSAT).
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Figure 2: Standardized Impact of Floods in Pakistan 1975 – 2012
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Figure 3: Scatter Plots of UNEP Flood Risk versus E↵ective Flood Exposure 2010/11
Correlation between ex ante flood risk from the UN Environmental Program (UNEP) and exposure measures. Expo-
sure area was calculated from UNITAR’s Operational Satellite Appliations Programme (UNOSAT) data. Population
(objective) exposure was calculated using 2010 Landscan population data along with UNOSAT flooded area data.
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Figure 4: Average Marginal E↵ect of Flood Exposure by Flood Risk in the 2013 PA Elections
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UNOSAT flooded area data.
33
Tables
Table 1: Main Result with Di↵erent Controls for Past Turnout
Turnout 2013 (mean=0.541; sd=0.104)
Controls Controls & Turnout Trend Controls & Turnout Levels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
% Pop. Exposed 0.097 0.147 0.066 0.117 0.165 0.084 0.118 0.130 0.066
(0.033) (0.028) (0.026) (0.039) (0.033) (0.026) (0.034) (0.030) (0.022)
Province FE X X X
Division FE X X X
R-Squared 0.301 0.465 0.613 0.345 0.488 0.636 0.548 0.604 0.706
Observations 556 556 556 556 556 556 556 556 556
Clusters 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109
Notes: Outcome variable is turnout in the 2013 election. Models 4 through 6 control for previous turnout using a trend variable (trend =
turnout08   turnout02). Models 7 through 9 control for previous turnout through 2002 and 2008 turnout level variables (turnout02, turnout08).
All regressions include controls for ex ante UNEP flood risk, distance to major river, dummy for constituencies bordering a major river, std.
dev. of the constituency’s elevation, and mean constituency elevation, as well as the percentage of the population a↵ected by flooding in 2012.
Unit of observation is a Provincial Assembly constituency. Standard errors are clustered at the district level and reported in parentheses.
Table 2: Main Result for Di↵erent Subsets
Full Sample Near Maj. Rivers Neighboring Maj. River
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
% Pop. Exposed 0.118 0.130 0.066 0.092 0.110 0.062 0.063 0.081 0.068
(0.034) (0.030) (0.022) (0.033) (0.027) (0.023) (0.027) (0.024) (0.024)
Province FE X X X
Division FE X X X
R-Squared 0.548 0.604 0.706 0.547 0.612 0.752 0.584 0.624 0.707
Observations 556 556 556 389 389 389 209 209 209
Clusters 109 109 109 77 77 77 63 63 63
Notes: Outcome variable is turnout in the 2013 election. Unit of observation is a Provincial Assembly constituency. All models control
for previous turnout through 2002 and 2008 turnout level variables (turnout02, turnout08). All regressions include controls for ex ante
UNEP flood risk, distance to major river, dummy for constituencies bordering a major river, std. dev. of the constituency’s elevation,
mean constituency elevation, and the percentage of the population a↵ected by flooding in 2012. Standard errors are clustered at the
district level and reported in parentheses.
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Table 3: Placebo Regressions with Di↵erent Controls for Past Turnout for Di↵erent Subsets
Turnout 2002 Turnout 2008 Turnout Di↵erence 08-02
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Full Sample
% Pop. Exposed -0.046 0.046 0.024 -0.103 -0.037 -0.040 -0.058 -0.082 -0.064
(0.038) (0.035) (0.021) (0.046) (0.039) (0.042) (0.034) (0.034) (0.036)
Province FE X X X
Division FE X X X
R-Squared 0.247 0.426 0.569 0.247 0.382 0.502 0.063 0.134 0.277
Observations 565 565 565 565 565 565 565 565 565
Clusters 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109
Panel B: Near Major Rivers
% Pop. Exposed -0.061 0.019 0.021 -0.105 -0.031 -0.035 -0.044 -0.049 -0.056
(0.040) (0.032) (0.024) (0.052) (0.043) (0.048) (0.036) (0.035) (0.042)
Province FE X X X
Division FE X X X
R-Squared 0.257 0.425 0.621 0.199 0.339 0.492 0.033 0.060 0.198
Observations 394 394 394 394 394 394 394 394 394
Clusters 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77
Panel C: Neighboring Major Rivers
% Pop. Exposed -0.027 0.052 0.017 -0.058 0.025 -0.003 -0.031 -0.026 -0.020
(0.044) (0.038) (0.031) (0.058) (0.041) (0.049) (0.039) (0.038) (0.044)
Province FE X X X
Division FE X X X
R-Squared 0.353 0.547 0.648 0.224 0.410 0.508 0.046 0.056 0.139
Observations 212 212 212 212 212 212 212 212 212
Clusters 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63
Notes: Unit of observation is a Provincial Assembly constituency. All regressions include controls for ex ante UNEP flood risk, distance
to major river, dummy for constituencies bordering a major river, std. dev. of the constituency’s elevation, and mean constituency
elevation. Standard errors are clustered at the district level and reported in parentheses.
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Table 4: Vote Share Regressions
National Balochistan & KPK Punjab Sindh
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Provincial Incumbent’s Vote Share 2013
% Pop. Exposed -0.061 0.065 0.051 0.046 -0.021 0.098 0.086 0.015
(0.087) (0.062) (0.067) (0.153) (0.139) (0.163) (0.098) (0.074)
Division FE X X X X
R-Squared 0.405 0.682 0.482 0.570 0.178 0.233 0.551 0.743
Observations 565 565 149 149 288 288 128 128
Clusters 109 109 50 50 36 36 23 23
Panel B: PPP Vote Share 2013
% Pop. Exposed 0.219 0.048 0.146 0.149 -0.036 -0.037 0.086 0.015
(0.074) (0.048) (0.082) (0.112) (0.101) (0.103) (0.098) (0.074)
Division FE X X X X
R-Squared 0.501 0.716 0.270 0.486 0.218 0.272 0.551 0.743
Observations 565 565 149 149 288 288 128 128
Clusters 109 109 50 50 36 36 23 23
Panel C: PML-N Vote Share 2013
% Pop. Exposed -0.102 0.021 -0.102 -0.038 -0.021 0.098 0.091 0.015
(0.081) (0.059) (0.110) (0.112) (0.139) (0.163) (0.056) (0.054)
Division FE X X X X
R-Squared 0.427 0.657 0.309 0.385 0.178 0.233 0.212 0.275
Observations 565 565 149 149 288 288 128 128
Clusters 109 109 50 50 36 36 23 23
Notes: Unit of observation is a Provincial Assembly constituency. All regressions include geographic controls, i.e., ex ante UNEP flood risk, distance to
major river, dummy for constituencies bordering a major river, std. dev. of the constituency’s elevation, mean constituency elevation, and the percentage
of the population a↵ected by flooding in 2012. Results are almost identical if we include political controls, i.e., the outcome variable in 2008, the degree of
political competitiveness in 2008 elections, a series of dummy variables indicating which major party represented the constituency between 2008 and 2013,
and interaction terms between the party dummies and political competition. Electoral data collected at the constituency level from the 2002, 2008, and 2013
National Assembly and Provincial Assembly elections. Standard errors are clustered at the district level and reported in parentheses.
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Table 5: Continuous and Dichotomous Interaction of Exposure with Flood Risk
Controls Controls & Turnout Trend Controls & Turnout Levels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Continuous Interaction
% Pop. Exposed 0.114 0.158 0.050 0.172 0.198 0.100 0.185 0.191 0.115
(0.063) (0.056) (0.045) (0.069) (0.063) (0.051) (0.056) (0.053) (0.042)
Flood Risk -0.010 -0.014 -0.010 -0.009 -0.012 -0.008 0.001 -0.003 -0.001
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
% Flooded ⇥ Risk -0.008 -0.005 0.007 -0.024 -0.015 -0.006 -0.029 -0.028 -0.020
(0.017) (0.018) (0.011) (0.022) (0.023) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.011)
Marginal E↵ects:
Flood Risk (25th pctile = .13) 0.113 0.157 0.051 0.169 0.196 0.099 0.181 0.188 0.112
(0.061) (0.054) (0.044) (0.067) (0.061) (0.049) (0.055) (0.051) (0.040)
Flood Risk (Median = .96) 0.107 0.153 0.056 0.149 0.184 0.094 0.157 0.165 0.096
(0.049) (0.042) (0.037) (0.052) (0.045) (0.038) (0.044) (0.040) (0.033)
Flood Risk (75th pctile = 2.22) 0.097 0.147 0.065 0.119 0.165 0.086 0.120 0.130 0.071
(0.033) (0.028) (0.027) (0.037) (0.032) (0.027) (0.031) (0.026) (0.023)
Province FE X X X
Division FE X X X
R-Squared 0.301 0.465 0.613 0.346 0.489 0.636 0.551 0.606 0.707
Observations 556 556 556 556 556 556 556 556 556
Clusters 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109
Panel B: Dichtomous Interaction with Flood Risk   1
% Pop. Exposed 0.153 0.149 0.063 0.192 0.177 0.095 0.202 0.184 0.114
(0.067) (0.066) (0.053) (0.066) (0.065) (0.051) (0.055) (0.058) (0.046)
Flood Risk   1 0.003 0.012 0.000 0.007 0.014 0.003 -0.008 0.002 0.000
(0.013) (0.010) (0.009) (0.014) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009)
% Flooded ⇥ Risk   1 -0.072 -0.005 0.004 -0.096 -0.018 -0.013 -0.107 -0.072 -0.061
(0.063) (0.064) (0.047) (0.065) (0.063) (0.046) (0.053) (0.056) (0.045)
E↵ect Di↵erential by Impact:
Flood Impact (Median = .07) 0.002 -0.012 -0.001 -0.000 -0.012 -0.002 0.015 0.002 0.004
(0.013) (0.010) (0.008) (0.014) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008)
Flood Impact (75th pctile = .21) 0.012 -0.011 -0.001 0.014 -0.010 0.000 0.030 0.013 0.013
(0.017) (0.015) (0.012) (0.016) (0.015) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.010)
Flood Impact (90th pctile = .42) 0.027 -0.010 -0.002 0.033 -0.006 0.003 0.052 0.028 0.025
(0.027) (0.026) (0.020) (0.026) (0.025) (0.018) (0.021) (0.021) (0.017)
Province FE X X X
Division FE X X X
R-Squared 0.303 0.466 0.613 0.347 0.489 0.636 0.553 0.606 0.707
Observations 556 556 556 556 556 556 556 556 556
Clusters 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109
Notes: Unit of observation is a Provincial Assembly constituency. Models 4 through 6 control for previous turnout using a trend variable (trend = turnout08  
turnout02). Models 7 through 9 control for previous turnout through 2002 and 2008 turnout level variables (turnout02, turnout08). All regressions include controls
for ex ante UNEP flood risk, distance to major river, dummy for constituencies bordering a major river, std. dev. of the constituency’s elevation, mean constituency
elevation, and the percentage of the population a↵ected by flooding in 2012. Marginal E↵ects in Panel A shows the e↵ect on turnout at the indicated level of flood
risk. E↵ect Di↵erentials in Panel B show the di↵erence between the e↵ect of flood impact on high risk areas versus low risk areas (turnoutrisk<1   turnoutrisk>1) at
the indicated level of flood exposure (where the distribution is conditional on flood exposure>0). Standard errors are clustered at the district level and reported in
parentheses.
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A Appendix: Summary Statistics
Table A.1: Summary Statistics for All Covariates of the Provincial Assembly Constituency Data
Variable Unit Median Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
Panel A: Outcomes
Turnout 2002 percentage points [0,1] 0.408 0.409 0.093 0.096 0.763 565
Turnout 2008 percentage points [0,1] 0.442 0.440 0.120 0.064 0.786 565
Turnout 2013 percentage points [0,1] 0.564 0.541 0.104 0.019 0.738 556
Turnout Change 2008-2002 percentage points [0,1] 0.030 0.031 0.080 -0.316 0.316 565
Total Votes Cast 2013 100,000 voters 0.843 0.802 0.273 0.007 1.564 556
Total Valid Votes 2013 100,000 voters 0.822 0.776 0.264 0.007 1.509 565
Registered Voters 2013 100,000 voters 1.475 1.452 0.388 0.328 3.004 565
Provincial Incumbent Vote Share 2013 percent [0,1] 0.349 0.308 0.213 0 0.898 565
PPP Vote Share 2013 percent [0,1] 0.060 0.144 0.184 0 0.898 565
PML-N Vote Share 2013 percent [0,1] 0.271 0.256 0.206 0 0.714 565
Panel B: Flood Treatment
% Population Exposed 2010 & 2011 percent [0,1] 0 0.067 0.147 0 1 565
Panel C: Controls
PPP Won Seat 2008 dummy 0 0.306 0.461 0 1 565
PML-N Won Seat 2008 dummy 0 0.191 0.394 0 1 565
PML-Q Won Seat 2008 dummy 0 0.173 0.379 0 1 565
Electoral Competitiveness 2008 index 0.835 0.771 0.215 0.037 0.999 565
UNEP Flood Risk average of 6pt index 0.957 1.312 1.266 0 5 565
Flood Risk   1 dummy 0 0.497 0.500 0 5 565
Distance to Nearest Major River 100 kilometers 0.270 0.582 0.895 0.001 6.353 565
Constituency Neighboring Major River dummy 0 0.375 0.485 0 1 565
Std. Dev. of Elevation 1,000 meters 0.002 0.026 0.053 0 0.323 565
Mean of Elevation 1,000 meters 0.054 0.118 0.183 0.001 1.293 565
% Population Exposed 2012 percent [0,1] 0 0.013 0.062 0 0.700 565
Total Votes Cast 2008 100,000 voters 0.641 0.606 0.222 0.087 1.270 565
Total Valid Votes 2008 100,000 voters 0.623 0.590 0.216 0.086 1.243 565
Registered Voters 2008 100,000 voters 1.364 1.365 0.357 0.139 2.259 565
Total Votes Cast 2002 100,000 voters 0.519 0.510 0.193 0.070 1.062 565
Total Valid Votes 2002 100,000 voters 0.506 0.496 0.187 0.068 1.027 565
Registered Voters 2002 100,000 voters 1.286 1.217 0.282 0.325 1.945 565
Index of Total Relief pca index -0.773 0.011 1.621 -0.773 7.628 555
Migration Estimate percent [0,1] 0.003 0.021 0.04 0 0.224 351
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B Appendix:Further Robustness Checks
Table B.1: Non-Linear Turnout Response to Flood Exposure
Full Sample Near Maj. Rivers Neighboring Maj. River
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
% Pop. Exposed 0.153 0.182 0.078 0.129 0.151 0.048 0.095 0.108 0.079
(0.070) (0.070) (0.050) (0.066) (0.057) (0.048) (0.069) (0.060) (0.058)
% Pop. Exposed2 -0.059 -0.085 -0.018 -0.060 -0.065 0.021 -0.051 -0.042 -0.016
(0.085) (0.086) (0.060) (0.075) (0.071) (0.054) (0.082) (0.072) (0.069)
Joint Significance:
F-stat 6.688 11.524 4.703 4.162 9.663 3.833 3.185 7.750 4.531
p-value (0.002) (0.000) (0.011) (0.019) (0.000) (0.026) (0.048) (0.001) (0.015)
Marginal E↵ects:
Flood Impact (Median = .07) 0.010 0.012 0.005 0.009 0.010 0.003 0.006 0.007 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Flood Impact (75th pctile = .21) 0.030 0.035 0.016 0.025 0.029 0.011 0.018 0.021 0.016
(0.012) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
Flood Impact (90th pctile = .42) 0.053 0.061 0.029 0.043 0.051 0.023 0.031 0.038 0.030
(0.017) (0.016) (0.012) (0.017) (0.014) (0.012) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014)
Province FE X X X
Division FE X X X
R-Squared 0.549 0.605 0.706 0.547 0.612 0.752 0.584 0.624 0.707
Observations 556 556 556 389 389 389 209 209 209
Clusters 109 109 109 77 77 77 63 63 63
Notes: Unit of observation is a Provincial Assembly constituency. All regressions include controls for ex ante UNEP flood risk, distance to major river,
dummy for constituencies bordering a major river, std. dev. of the constituency’s elevation, mean constituency elevation, the percentage of the population
a↵ected by flooding in 2012, and turnout levels in 2002 and 2008. Joint Significance reports the F-statistic for significance of % Pop. Exposed and its
squared term jointly. Marginal E↵ects show the linear combination of % Pop. Exposed and % Pop. Exposed2 at the indicated level of flood impact (Note:
impact distribution level conditional on flood exposure>0). Standard errors are clustered at the district level and reported in parentheses.
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Table B.2: Checking For Di↵erence in Response to Flooding Between Urban and Rural Areas
Full Sample Near Maj. Rivers Neighboring Maj. River
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
% Pop. Exposed 0.132 0.138 0.081 0.098 0.114 0.066 0.060 0.081 0.064
(0.036) (0.030) (0.028) (0.037) (0.026) (0.028) (0.032) (0.025) (0.031)
Urban 0.000 -0.002 0.010 -0.018 -0.015 -0.008 -0.033 -0.021 -0.022
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.008) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009)
% Flooded ⇥ Urban -0.112 -0.077 -0.094 -0.052 -0.029 -0.038 -0.006 -0.016 -0.024
(0.052) (0.058) (0.049) (0.056) (0.064) (0.034) (0.048) (0.054) (0.045)
Province FE X X X
Division FE X X X
R-Squared 0.551 0.606 0.708 0.554 0.615 0.754 0.598 0.630 0.713
Observations 556 556 556 389 389 389 209 209 209
Clusters 109 109 109 77 77 77 63 63 63
Notes: Outcome is turnout in 2013. Unit of observation is a Provincial Assembly constituency. ‘Urban’ is defined as constituencies with
population density above the 75th percentile of the population density distribution, approximately 921 people per square kilometer. All
regressions include controls for ex ante UNEP flood risk, distance to major river, dummy for constituencies bordering a major river, std.
dev. of the constituency’s elevation, mean constituency elevation, the percentage of the population a↵ected by flooding in 2012, and
turnout levels in 2002 and 2008. Standard errors are clustered at the district level and reported in parentheses.
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Table B.3: Alternative Turnout Measure (Valid Votes/ Registered Voters)
Turnout 2013 (mean=0.525; sd=0.100)
Controls Controls & Turnout Trend Controls & Turnout Levels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
% Pop. Exposed 0.088 0.131 0.057 0.094 0.136 0.060 0.094 0.106 0.043
(0.032) (0.024) (0.027) (0.032) (0.025) (0.026) (0.030) (0.024) (0.023)
Province FE X X X
Division FE X X X
R-Squared 0.304 0.472 0.626 0.311 0.475 0.628 0.485 0.569 0.682
Observations 565 565 565 565 565 565 565 565 565
Clusters 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109
Notes: Outcome variable is turnout in the 2013 election measured as valid votes/registered voters. Models 4 through 6 control for previous
turnout using a trend variable (trend = turnout08   turnout02). Models 7 through 9 control for previous turnout through 2002 and 2008
turnout level variables (turnout02, turnout08). All regressions include controls for ex ante UNEP flood risk, distance to major river, dummy
for constituencies bordering a major river, std. dev. of the constituency’s elevation, and mean constituency elevation, as well as the percentage
of the population a↵ected by flooding in 2012. Unit of observation is a Provincial Assembly constituency. Standard errors are clustered at the
district level and reported in parentheses.
Table B.4: Alternative Turnout Measure (Valid Votes/ Registered Voters)
Full Sample Near Maj. Rivers Neighboring Maj. River
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
% Pop. Exposed 0.094 0.106 0.043 0.069 0.092 0.045 0.050 0.070 0.048
(0.030) (0.024) (0.023) (0.028) (0.017) (0.022) (0.025) (0.017) (0.023)
Province FE X X X
Division FE X X X
R-Squared 0.485 0.569 0.682 0.468 0.564 0.691 0.531 0.586 0.665
Observations 565 565 565 394 394 394 212 212 212
Clusters 109 109 109 77 77 77 63 63 63
Notes: Outcome variable is turnout in the 2013 election measured as valid votes/registered voters. Unit of observation is a Provincial
Assembly constituency. All models control for previous turnout through 2002 and 2008 turnout level variables (turnout02, turnout08).
All regressions include controls for ex ante UNEP flood risk, distance to major river, dummy for constituencies bordering a major
river, std. dev. of the constituency’s elevation, mean constituency elevation, and the percentage of the population a↵ected by flooding
in 2012. Standard errors are clustered at the district level and reported in parentheses.
5
Table B.5: Regressions on Components of Turnout for Di↵erent Subsets
Votes Cast 2013 Valid Votes Cast 2013 Registered Voters 2013
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Full Sample
% Pop. Exposed -0.004 0.128 0.142 -0.008 0.115 0.130 -0.234 -0.063 0.104
(0.084) (0.048) (0.050) (0.086) (0.049) (0.048) (0.135) (0.110) (0.064)
Province FE X X X
Division FE X X X
R-Squared 0.618 0.751 0.798 0.611 0.745 0.799 0.427 0.586 0.702
Observations 556 556 556 565 565 565 565 565 565
Clusters 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109
Panel B: Near Major Rivers
% Pop. Exposed 0.051 0.193 0.162 0.044 0.177 0.148 -0.117 0.080 0.143
(0.100) (0.056) (0.060) (0.100) (0.053) (0.056) (0.145) (0.095) (0.076)
Province FE X X X
Division FE X X X
R-Squared 0.474 0.654 0.732 0.460 0.641 0.719 0.223 0.419 0.582
Observations 389 389 389 394 394 394 394 394 394
Clusters 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77
Panel C: Neighboring Major Rivers
% Pop. Exposed 0.012 0.174 0.186 0.006 0.151 0.150 -0.136 0.098 0.151
(0.098) (0.062) (0.067) (0.095) (0.057) (0.061) (0.161) (0.119) (0.074)
Province FE X X X
Division FE X X X
R-Squared 0.532 0.651 0.757 0.525 0.638 0.749 0.277 0.412 0.671
Observations 209 209 209 212 212 212 212 212 212
Clusters 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 63
Notes: Unit of observation is a Provincial Assembly constituency. All regressions include controls for ex ante UNEP flood risk, dis-
tance to major river, dummy for constituencies bordering a major river, std. dev. of the constituency’s elevation, mean constituency
elevation, the percentage of the population a↵ected by flooding in 2012, and turnout levels in 2002 and 2008. Standard errors are
clustered at the district level and reported in parentheses.
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Table B.6: Controlling for Migration
Full Sample Near Maj. Rivers Neighboring Maj. River
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Controlling for Migration
% Pop. Exposed 0.097 0.120 0.058 0.040 0.066 0.037 0.036 0.036 0.040
(0.042) (0.036) (0.027) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.018) (0.021) (0.039)
Migration 0.089 0.074 -0.081 -0.202 -0.200 -0.117 0.205 0.214 0.238
(0.189) (0.174) (0.149) (0.179) (0.163) (0.144) (0.104) (0.107) (0.159)
Province FE X X X
Division FE X X X
R-Squared 0.582 0.626 0.741 0.511 0.537 0.729 0.630 0.638 0.680
Observations 345 345 345 218 218 218 113 113 113
Clusters 58 58 58 39 39 39 30 30 30
Panel B: Subset of Constituencies with No Migration
% Pop. Exposed 0.102 0.102 0.060 0.090 0.097 0.061 0.099 0.104 0.066
(0.031) (0.026) (0.021) (0.034) (0.030) (0.024) (0.034) (0.033) (0.025)
Province FE X X X
Division FE X X X
R-Squared 0.569 0.644 0.743 0.549 0.606 0.719 0.549 0.602 0.717
Observations 378 378 378 332 332 332 281 281 281
Clusters 87 87 87 77 77 77 71 71 71
Notes: Migration measure was calculated using our national survey data by assuming that all those reporting any damage who live
in una↵ected districts migrated because of the flood and then estimating the migration rates for the 61 districts in our survey (recall
the sample was designed to be district representative). This is an imperfect measure but if people who moved out were less likely
to vote, then we should see a negative conditional correlation between the number of migrants in una↵ected communities and our
outcome variables. Unit of observation is a Provincial Assembly constituency. All regressions include controls for ex ante UNEP
flood risk, distance to major river, dummy for constituencies bordering a major river, std. dev. of the constituency’s elevation, mean
constituency elevation, the percentage of the population a↵ected by flooding in 2012, and turnout levels in 2002 and 2008. Standard
errors are clustered at the district level and reported in parentheses.
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Table B.7: Controlling for Total Relief Provision
Full Sample Near Maj. Rivers Neighboring Maj. River
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
% Pop. Exposed 0.126 0.117 0.060 0.099 0.099 0.061 0.084 0.081 0.069
(0.037) (0.032) (0.023) (0.038) (0.031) (0.025) (0.033) (0.030) (0.026)
Total Relief -0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.000 -0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Province FE X X X
Division FE X X X
R-Squared 0.549 0.604 0.706 0.544 0.609 0.751 0.587 0.624 0.707
Observations 546 546 546 379 379 379 209 209 209
Clusters 106 106 106 74 74 74 63 63 63
Notes: Unit of observation is a Provincial Assembly constituency. All regressions include controls for ex ante UNEP flood risk,
distance to major river, dummy for constituencies bordering a major river, std. dev. of the constituency’s elevation, mean constituency
elevation, the percentage of the population a↵ected by flooding in 2012, and turnout levels in 2002 and 2008. Standard errors are
clustered at the district level and reported in parentheses.
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C Appendix: Individual-Level Survey Based Results
This section summarizes results from a nationally representative survey we conducted in early
2012, in between the floods and the 2013 general election in Pakistan. The questions reported on
in this section were included in the 2012 survey because we expected that the flood might influence
support for aggressive political action/participation. We built in a vignette experiment to test that
hypothesis and also included measures of political knowledge.
The research described in this appendix generated the hypothesis in the main paper that flood
impact should increase turnout at the aggregate level. We present this work here to better explain
our inductive process.
C.1 Data
The National Survey
We created district-representative samples of 155-675 households in 61 districts with a modest
over-sample in heavily flood-a↵ected districts as determined by our spatial flood exposure data.
We sampled 15 districts in Balochistan, 14 in KPK, 12 in Sindh, and 20 in Punjab to ensure we
covered a large proportion of the districts in each of Pakistan’s four regular provinces. Within
each province we sampled the two largest districts and then chose additional districts using a
simple random sample. The main results below should be taken as representative for our sampling
strategy which, while diverse in terms of coverage, does overrepresent Pakistanis from the smaller
provinces.1 Our Pakistani partners, SEDCO Associates, fielded the survey between January 7 and
March 21, 2012, 17 months after the 2010 flood, 5 months after the summer 2011 floods in Sindh,
and 14 months prior to the 2013 general election. Our overall response rate was 71%, with 14.5%
of households contacted refusing to complete the survey and 14.5% of the targeted households not
interviewed because no one was home who could take the survey. This response rate is similar to
the 70% obtained in the General Social Survey in recent years and exceeds the 59.5% achieved by
the 2012 American National Election Survey (GSS, 2013; ANES, 2014).
Treatment Measure: Subjective Reports
Our subjective measure of flood exposure comes from a question included in our survey. To get
variation in flood impacts at the household level, we also asked respondents how the floods impacted
them personally. We use the following question to measure respondents’ subjective assessments of
flood damage:2
“How badly were you personally harmed by the floods?” (response options: “extremely
badly,” “very badly,” “somewhat badly,” “not at all”)
We coded the Likert scale to range from 0 to 1.
1Weighted results using either sample weights calculated from Landscan gridded population data or those provided
by the Pakistan Federal Bureau of Statistics for our survey are substantively and statistically similar.
2Responses to this question correlate well with our other self-reported measure. We asked respondents to rate
how much money they lost as a result of the floods on an ordinal scale: less than 50k Pakistani Rupee (Rs.), 50k Rs.
to 100k Rs., 100k-300k Rs., and more than 300k Rs. The Pearson correlation between that loss and the subjective
measure of exposure above is quite high (r = .73).
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Outcome Measure: Political Knowledge
We construct a measure of political knowledge using a battery of binary questions. To tap awareness
of political issues, we asked respondents whether they were aware of four policy debates prominent
in early 2012: whether to use the army to reduce conflict in Karachi; how to incorporate the FATA
into the rest of Pakistan; what should be done to resolve the disputed border with Afghanistan;
and whether the government should open peace talks with India. We also asked six questions about
various political o ces and scored whether respondents correctly identified the following: who led
the ruling coalition in Parliament (the PPP); and the names of the President, Prime Minister, Chief
Minister of their Province, Chief of Army Sta↵, and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
Following Kolenikov and Angeles (2009), we conducted a principal components analysis on the
polychoric correlation matrix of these items and use the first principal component as our measure
of political knowledge. That component accounts for 49.15% of the variance in the index of ten
components, suggesting it does a good job of capturing the underlying construct.
The political knowledge index can also be considered a proxy for political engagement. Re-
spondents either know these facts or they do not; they cannot dissemble. Di↵erences between
respondents across the flood gradient must either reflect some real investment in acquiring po-
litical knowledge or some pre-existing background trait that is correlated with both experiencing
the floods and political knowledge. The latter is unlikely subject to our identifying assumptions
outlined below. Moreover, since our core estimating equation for individual-level outcomes includes
controls for a range of slow-changing factors that one could imagine are correlated with both ex-
posure risk and political engagement—including literacy, numeracy, age, education, gender, and
head of household status—we believe the knowledge variable most likely represents investments in
political knowledge triggered by the flood.
Outcome Measure: Support for Assertive Political Action
In order to measure support for assertive political action we use a vignette experiment. This
approach circumvents three main challenges to measuring political attitudes. First, respondents
may face social desirability pressures to not explicitly support particular views (e.g., aggressive civic
protests). Second, concepts such as the political e cacy of being assertive are not easily explainable
in standard survey questions but can be illustrated with examples. Third, respondent answers to
direct questions may not be interpersonally comparable (King et al., 2004). To overcome these
challenges, we wrote two vignettes describing concrete (but fictional) examples of two di↵erent
ways of getting the government’s attention: passive petition or assertive protest. Respondents were
randomly assigned to receive one of the vignettes before answering the same two survey questions
on how e↵ective they think the chosen method is and whether they approve of it.
More specifically, the vignette experiment works as follows. At the primary sampling unit (PSU)
level, respondents are randomly assigned to read one of the following two vignettes:
Passive Petition. Junaid lives in a village that lacks clean drinking water. He works
with his neighbors to draw attention to the issue by collecting signatures on a petition.
He plans to present the petition to each of the candidates before the upcoming local
elections.
Assertive Protest. Junaid lives in a village that lacks clean drinking water. He works
with his neighbors to draw attention to the issue by angrily protesting outside the o ce
of the district coordinating o cial. As the government workers exit the o ce, they
threaten and shove them.
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Following the vignette respondents are asked the following:
• E↵ectiveness. “How e↵ective do you think Junaid will be in getting clean drinking water for
his village?” (response options: “extremely e↵ective,” “very e↵ective,” “moderately e↵ective,”
“slightly e↵ective,” “not e↵ective at all”)
• Approval. “How much do you approve of Junaid’s actions?” (response options: “a great deal,”
“a lot,” “a moderate amount,” “a little,” “not at all”)
Our vignette experiment is intended to convey a clear di↵erence in the aggressiveness with
which citizens demand government services. We therefore varied three elements of how the citizens
in the vignette engaged with the government: immediacy, target, and method. The next election
was expected to happen in 2013 when we did our survey, so the Passive Petition vignette clearly
conveys a demand that will be delayed, while the Assertive Protest one describes something that
could happen right now. With respect to target, the district coordinating o cial (DCO) is the
relevant o cial for drinking water issues, but he/she is an appointed bureaucrat who reports to
the Chief Minister of the province. If citizens go to the DCO he/she can do something right away,
whereas local politicians have to go to the senior party leadership of the party in power in their
province who may then reach back down to the DCO. The Passive Petition vignette thus conveys
a situation where the response to citizen action will be indirect at best, while the Assertive Protest
one portrays citizens going right to the o cial who has to implement any changes. With respect
to method, holding a protest that turns violent is clearly more aggressive than signing a petition.
While our compound treatment does not allow us to distinguish which of the three elements was
critical, it provides a clear di↵erence in how assertive the citizens’ approach is understood to be in
the Pakistani context.
Our sample is well balanced across conditions in the vignette experiment on a broad range of
geographic, demographic, and attitudinal variables. The di↵erence in means between the groups
within a region therefore provides an estimate of how e↵ective/acceptable citizens think the use of
assertive action is to pressure their government o cials.
Demographic Controls
We include the following demographic controls: gender, a head of household indicator, age, a
literacy and basic numeracy competency indicator, education, a Sunni indicator, and an index of
religious practice.
C.2 Empirical Strategy
Our estimation strategy at the individual level is to use fixed e↵ects and respondent-level controls
to isolate the e↵ect of local variance in flood impact that is unrelated to average flood risk. At
the individual level, we estimate the model with tehsil fixed e↵ects, the third level administrative
subunit in Pakistan, thereby exploiting variation in flood e↵ects at the household level within
tehsils. Our choice of this strategy is motivated by discussions with those involved in flood relief
who cited great within-village variance. Surveys done to assess post-flood recovery needs also
showed there could be huge variation in damages su↵ered at the household level that were not
anticipated (Kurosaki et al., 2011), likely due to minor topographical features that impacted flow
rates, how long areas were submerged, and so on.
For the the political knowledge index our estimating equation is therefore a fixed-e↵ect regression
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Yi = ↵+  1Fi +  2Ri +  d +BXi + ✏i, (1)
where Fi is one of our flood exposure measures, Ri is the UNEP measure of ex ante flood risk,  d
is a district fixed-e↵ect for objective flood treatments (i.e., the measure of tehsil-level flood exposure
derived from the UNOSAT data) and a tehsil fixed-e↵ect for subjective flood exposure measures
(i.e., self-reports), and Xi is a vector of demographic and geographic controls to further isolate the
impact of idiosyncratic flood e↵ects by accounting for the linear impact of those variables within
tehsils. We cluster standard errors at the primary sampling unit level when analyzing survey data.
For the vignette experiment our measurement approach leverages a di↵erence-in-di↵erence es-
timator to answer the following question: given that people are generally opposed to the assertive
vignette, is the di↵erence in reactions between the two vignettes smaller for people in areas exposed
to the flooding? To answer that question we need to control for a range of potential confounding
variables. For example, is it possible that the land in districts close to rivers (which are most likely
to be flooded) is less desirable and so people living there tend to be poorer and more marginalized,
which one could argue would make them more willing to support aggressive protest. In the Pak-
istani context this is unlikely since land near the rivers is actually more fertile, which may be why
population density is substantially higher near major rivers. This observation, however, raises the
possibility that people who are more likely to be a↵ected by floods would tend to be wealthier and
less marginalized. In either case, we risk confounding flood exposure with a more fixed character-
istic of the region and the people who reside there. We cannot completely overcome this challenge
because we only have survey data from a single cross section, but by including a broad range of
controls and examining subsets of the data we can gain increased confidence in the results.
We therefore estimate the following as our core specification for analyzing the vignette experi-
ment:
Yi = ↵+  1Ai +  2Fi +  3(Ai ⇥ Fi) +  d +BXi + ✏i, (2)
where i indexes respondents. The outcome, Yi, represents a response to either the e↵ectiveness
or approval question. The key treatment variables are Ai, an indicator for whether an individual
received the assertive protest vignette, and Fi, a respondent’s flood exposure (either objectively
measured or self-reported). To control for locality-specific propensities to express approval or
perceived e↵ectiveness, we include  d, a district fixed e↵ect when Fi is based on objective tehsil-
level measurements and a tehsil fixed-e↵ect when Fi is measured with individually reported flood
exposure. Xi is a vector of demographic and geographic controls to further isolate the impact of
idiosyncratic flood e↵ects. We again cluster standard errors at the PSU level since that is the level
at which the vignette was randomized.3
The estimate of  3 in these equations isolates the causal impact of the flood to the extent
that: (1) which vignette a respondent got was exogenous to their political attitudes; and (2) how
exposed one was to the floods depended on factors orthogonal to pre-existing political factors once
we condition on district-specific traits and the geographic controls. The first condition is true due
to random assignment of the survey treatment. The second condition is likely to be met because
the floods had a large random component and because we are controlling for the obvious factors
that could have been used ex ante to predict which areas were likely to be flooded.
3Results are robust to clustering at the district level to account for the possibility that the variance in attitudes
is highly correlated within districts as well as within PSUs.
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C.3 Results
The floods clear increased both political knowledge acquired 7-14 months after the floods as well
as support for assertive politics.
As Table C.1 highlights, we find clear evidence of behavioral change among flood-a↵ected in-
dividuals in so far as they seem to have invested more in acquiring political knowledge. Our main
index of political knowledge is increasing across both the UNOSAT data on flood exposure and self
assessments of flood impact. The e↵ects are statistically quite strong and substantively meaningful.
A one standard deviation increase in the proportion of the population a↵ected by the floods in the
surveyed teshils (.165) predicts a .022 increase in the additive knowledge index and a .072 increase
in the PCA index, both approximately .1 standard deviation treatment e↵ects. For self-assessed
flood exposure movement from the bottom of the scale to the top was associated with a .13 standard
deviation increase in the additive index and a .16 standard deviation increase in the PCA index.
Table C.1: Impact of Flooding on Political Knowledge
Additive Index PCA Index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
% Pop. Exposed 0.136 0.438
(0.041) (0.138)
Flood Exposure (4-pt Likert Scale) 0.029 0.120
(0.012) (0.040)
District FE X X
Tehsil FE X X
R-Squared 0.379 0.407 0.375 0.404
Observations 10925 10925 10925 10925
Clusters 1058 1058 1058 1058
Notes: Unit of observation is an individual. All regressions include individual level controls
for gender, head of household, age, reading and mathematical abilities, education, sunni, and
intensity of religious practice. Columns 1 and 3 also include geographic controls for ex ante
UNEP flood risk, distance to major river, dummy for constituencies bordering a major river,
std. dev. of the constituency’s elevation, mean constituency elevation calculated at the tehsil
level. Standard errors are clustered at the survey’s primary sampling unit and reported in
parentheses. Subjective flood exposure scaled to be in .25 to 1.
Turning to the vignette experiment, we find that citizens exposed to floods are significantly
more supportive of assertive approaches towards demanding public services and believe them to be
more e↵ective than their non-exposed counterparts, as Table C.2 shows. The first coe cient in each
model,  1 from Equation 2, measures the di↵erence in the outcome variables between the assertive
and passive vignettes for people who scored a zero on the flood exposure measures. Those who
received the assertive vignette but did not experience flooding rated the e↵ectiveness of Junaid’s
actions between .23 and .3 units lower on a 0-1 scale controlling for a broad range of geographic
and demographic controls, a movement of more than .5 standard deviations in all models. That
e↵ect is consistent across objective (Column 1) and self-reported measures of flooding (Column 2).
We find results of similar magnitude for the approval dependent variable (Columns 3 and 4).
Exposure to the flood substantially and significantly decreased this disapproval. The coe cient
on the third variable in each model,  3 from Equation 2, indicates the moderating impact of
flood exposure on the e↵ect of the assertive vignette. A one standard deviation movement in the
proportion of the population exposed in tehsils with non-zero flood exposure (.17) corresponds to
a .16 standard deviation increase in perceived e↵ectiveness of the assertive approach and a .18
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standard deviation increase in approval for it. High levels of flood exposure
To benchmark these results we can consider the relationship between the vignette response
and gender. Existing research has shown that men are on average more likely to have more as-
sertive attitudes in the context of normal social relations (e.g., Funk et al., 1999) and tend to have
more extreme views in some political settings involving violent contestation (e.g., Jaeger et al.,
2012). The di↵erence in perceived e↵ectiveness of the assertive vignette between men and women
is approximately .08, which equates to a .2 standard deviation movement in e↵ectiveness, and the
di↵erence in approval is of similar size (.07). The di↵erence between those a↵ected by the flood and
those who were not in terms of approval is thus slightly smaller than the gender di↵erence in the
approval of assertive action. The gender di↵erence in perceived e↵ectiveness and approval across
the two conditions is even smaller, roughly .06 for e↵ectiveness and .04 for approval, both of which
are substantially smaller than all the flood coe cients.
Drawing on prior work we can also compare the flood a↵ects to di↵erences across attitudes
towards Islamist militants’ political positions. Following Fair, Malhotra and Shapiro (2012), we
measured individuals’ support for five political positions espoused by militant Islamist groups and
combined these in a simple additive scale ranging from 0 to 1. Moving from 0 to 1 on this scale
equates to a .21 increase in approval for the assertive vignette and a .11 increase in e↵ectiveness.
The impact of a one standard deviation move in flood exposure is similar in terms of approval of
the assertive vignette to the di↵erence between people who agree with none of the Islamist policy
positions and those who agree with all five (and is much larger on the e↵ectiveness measure), which
indicates a substantively significant shift.
Interestingly, the results are not a proxy for satisfaction with flood relief. We asked respondents
“In your opinion, did the government do a good or bad job in responding to the floods after they
occurred?” on a four-point scale ranging from “very bad” to “very good” with no midpoint so
respondents were forced to assign a direction to their views of the government response. Respon-
dents’ feelings about the assertive vignette are not consistently correlated with how they believe
the government did in responding to the floods. For some measure of flood e↵ects the di↵erence-
in-di↵erence is larger among the 5,188 respondents who felt the government did a poor job of
responding to the floods (about 50% of the sample after controlling for individual level covariates),
while for others it is higher among the 5,171 respondents who felt the government did a good job.
Clearly we cannot interpret the lack of a di↵erence as falsifying a causal relationship between the
quality of government response and attitudes on the vignette. Individuals who rate the government
response poorly may do so because they have some unobservable di↵erence that also makes them
more approving of assertive protests to gain political services. Nevertheless, the fact that there
is no consistent correlation suggests that the floods a↵ected attitudes through some channel other
than satisfaction with government performance.4
The finding that flood victims approve of assertive protests and believe they are more e↵ective
in getting a government response is quite robust. One might be concerned, for example, that
there is unobserved heterogeneity between tehsils which is driving these results. To account for
this possibility and to exploit the substantial within-village variation noted by many observers
(Kurosaki et al., 2011), we estimated the impact of self-reported flood measures on the vignette
experiment including tehsil fixed e↵ects (Columns 2 and 4). The results on self-reported flood
e↵ects are about the same when we use fixed e↵ects to account for any tehsil-level variance in flood
impacts and other potential tehsil-level confounders.
Overall, it appears clear that citizens hit hard by the floods developed more assertive attitudes
about demanding government services and invest more in acquiring political knowledge, but they do
4Results available from authors.
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not swing to either the national ruling party at the time of the flood or the main opposition party.
These changes could none-the-less shift politicians’ incentives. It is easy to imagine a situation in
which an exogenous increase in citizen attention leads politicians on all sides to exert increased
e↵ort, leading to increased turnout but leaving equilibrium vote shares unchanged.
Table C.2: Impact of Flooding on Approval and Perceived E cacy of Aggressive Protest
E↵ectivness Approval
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Aggressive Vignette -0.226 -0.231 -0.243 -0.250
(0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019)
% Pop. Exposed 0.010 -0.043
(0.106) (0.112)
Aggressive ⇥ % Flooded 0.325 0.366
(0.089) (0.091)
Flood Exposure (4-pt Likert Scale) 0.023 -0.018
(0.026) (0.029)
Aggressive ⇥ Exposure 0.140 0.156
(0.035) (0.038)
District FE X X
Tehsil FE X X
R-Squared 0.258 0.331 0.281 0.352
Observations 10761 10761 10761 10761
Clusters 1055 1055 1055 1055
Notes: Unit of observation is an individual. All regressions include individual level controls
for gender, head of household, age, reading and mathematical abilities, education, sunni, and
intensity of religious practice. Columns 1 and 3 also include geographic controls for ex ante
UNEP flood risk, distance to major river, dummy for constituencies bordering a major river,
std. dev. of the constituency’s elevation, mean constituency elevation calculated at the tehsil
level. Standard errors are clustered at the survey’s primary sampling unit and reported in
parentheses.
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